The cournot duopoly model reconsidered in the presence of costly communication and enforcement agreements

Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution.     

Foreign Aid in the Aftermath of Large Natural Disasters

This paper examines Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the aftermath of large natural disasters between 1970 and 2008. Using an event‐study approach, the paper finds that while the median increase in ODA is 18% compared with pre‐disaster flows, the typical surge is small in relation to the size of the affected economies. Moreover, aid surges typically cover only 3% of the total estimated economic damages caused by the disasters. The main determinants of post‐disaster aid surges are found to be the intensity of the event itself and the recipient country's characteristics such as the level of development, country size and the stock of foreign reserves. The paper does not find evidence that political considerations or strategic behavior on the part of donors determine the size of post‐disaster aid surges.