Questioning quotas: applying a relational framework for diversity management practices in the United Arab Emirates

The use of quota systems to improve demographic diversity in organisations is receiving mixed responses from commentators. This article demonstrates that the normative success and failure of a quota system is contingent upon the multi‐level and relational dynamics of the diversity management intervention, which uses the tool of quotas. Focusing on a quota system, which seeks to promote localisation of the workforce in the United Arab Emirates, this article presents a longitudinal case study. We analyse the multi‐level dynamics of the implementation of the quota system to show how the interdependence of these levels influenced the outcome of the quota programme. The study also accounts for the complexity of normative assessment of the quota‐based diversity intervention by illustrating how a diverse set of vested interests, a multiplicity of discourses and the interplay of schemas of change, support and resistance between managers and employees come into play.     

Can the Large Swings in Russian Life Satisfaction be Explained by Ups and Downs in Real Incomes?*

Russians reported large changes in their life satisfaction over the post‐transition years. In this paper, we explore the factors that drove these changes, focusing on exogenous income changes, using panel data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey over the period 1995 to 2001 and implementing a recently developed ordinal fixed‐effects estimator. We apply a causal decomposition technique that allows for bias arising from panel attrition when establishing aggregate trends in life satisfaction. Changes in real household incomes explained 10% of the total change in reported life satisfaction between 1996 and 2000, but up to 30% of some year‐on‐year changes.     

Why and How Combining Strong and Weak Ties within a Single Interorganizational R&D Collaboration Outperforms Other Collaboration Structures

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why and how an ambidextrous interorganizational R&D collaboration outperforms other collaboration structures in the creation of innovation. This research effort contributes to a growing stream of research in social network theory suggesting that the contradictory theories of the strength of weak ties and weak network structures on the one hand and the theory of strong ties and closed network structures on the other have a mutually reinforcing effect on innovation outcomes if combined rather than considered separately. An in‐depth exploratory single case study approach within an innovatively organized national R&D collaboration allowed giving further evidence for such a superior innovation performance and for this research to contribute to theory by demonstrating why and how such a combination may lead to higher innovation output and how this effect can be actively reinforced. It is suggested that the combination of strong and weak ties should occur at the individual rather than at the project or firm level. The authors distinguish between the additive effects of the respective innovation benefits of strong and weak ties, a positive interaction effect in the portfolio of dyadic ties of an individual and a second multilevel interaction effect of weak ties embedded in the ambidextrous network structure. Referring to previous empirical findings, intellectual property regulation and structural interdependency between network members showed a higher impact than trust with regard to leveraging weak ties and are important sources for achieving the multilevel interaction effect. Managerial implications of this research are that a large network will outperform several smaller, independent networks given that the right structure and processes are in place. Direct implications for the architecture of an ambidextrous R&D collaboration are discussed, and a framework for a new form of technology R&D collaboration called “semi‐open organization” is presented, which places itself between the extremes of traditional R&D in closed organizations and completely “open innovation” approaches.     

Development of a Network-location-model for the Economic Optimization of Local Heating Systems in Urban Chile

Cogeneration of heat and electricity is an important pillar of energy and climate policy. To plan the production and distribution system of combined heat and power (CHP) systems for residential heating, suitable methods for decision support are needed. For a comprehensive feasibility analysis, the integration of the location and capacity planning of the power plants, the choice of customers, and the network planning of the heating network into one optimization model are necessary. Thus, we develop an optimization model for electricity generation and heat supply. This mixed integer linear program (MILP) is based on graph theory for network flow problems. We apply the network location model for the optimization of district heating systems in the City of Osorno in Chile, which exhibits the “checkerboard layout” typically found in many South American cities. The network location model can support the strategic planning of investments in renewable energy projects because it permits the analysis of changing energy prices, calculation of break-even prices for heat and electricity, and estimation of greenhouse gas emission savings.     

The new EEC Merger Control System

On September 21st, 1990 the EEC Merger Control System became effective. The author discusses three problems that have arisen in the European debate on establishing a supra-national merger control:

Nahrungssicherheit und Agrarspekulation: Was ist politisch zu tun?

This short essay on financial speculation with agricultural commodities offers (1) a survey on the real economy factors that caused recent hunger crises, (2) an overview of the academic research on the impact of index-based financial speculation on agricultural markets, and (3) a discussion of political measures that are appropriate — or inappropriate — for improving global food security.     

CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis

We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest. Stock price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved in director selection. Our evidence may illuminate a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce pressure from active monitoring, and we find a recent trend of companies removing CEOs from involvement in director selection.     

Risks and Rewards in Emerging Market Investments

In light of the recent currency crises in East Asia, this article questions the accepted wisdom that emerging market securities deserve to be included in global portfolios primarily because of their low correlations with more conventional asset classes. The authors suggest that the basic cycle of emerging market loans and securities appears to have been compressed, and its swings accentuated, by the herd-like behavior of global institutional investors. This is not the irrational behavior of crowds infected by investment euphoria, but the rational behavior (however volatile) of a large number of institutional investors with huge stakes in the market, each trying to outperform or at least keep up with the others. While stressing the benefits of foreign capital for emerging nations, Smith and Walter also point to the adverse consequences of abrupt shifts in investor sentiment and capital flows. Citing a recent World Bank study, the authors suggest that the effect of portfolio equity inflows on many developing economies has been a “glut” of foreign exchange and liquidity, which tends to cause inflationary pressure and appreciation of real exchange rates. Such currency appreciation can in turn have unwanted “real” effects, such as increases in trade deficits. Going somewhat “against the grain of the Washington Consensus,” the authors suggest that emerging nations undertake a gradual, though steady movement toward adoption of freemarket policies. In particular, they cite with approval attempts by more successful emerging nations such as Chile and South Africa to limit portfolio capital inflows to avoid this problem of excess liquidity. As the authors conclude, “At no point in their development did now-established countries like Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain, and Chile adopt a totally free-market approach. They moved purposefully over decades in that direction, but only at a pace that could be accommodated by the accompanying political thinking and infrastructure-building.”     

Universal banking and financial architecture

Discussions of systemic risk after the financial crisis of 2007–09 have focused heavily on so-called “systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs) a cohort of financial firms that is almost exclusively (but not necessarily) comprised of large, complex and heavily interconnected financial conglomerates. This paper considers the economic and strategic drivers of SIFIs – if such institutions are a key source of systemic risk, it is important to understand how and why they get that way. The paper then sets forth a public-interest perspective on the financial architecture by setting out key benchmarks – static and dynamic efficiency, stability and robustness, and competitiveness – and the tradeoffs that exist between them, and examines how SIFIs can support or detract from these benchmarks. If SIFIs are to be subject to much sharper prudential regulation, its impact must be calibrated against systemic performance benchmarks. Finally, the paper focuses on some of the major regulatory initiatives following the 2007–09 financial crisis, and in particular the US Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010, in terms of their possible impact on business models of SIFIs. The paper concludes that improving the financial architecture in a disciplined, consistent, internationally coordinated and sustained manner with a firm eye to the public interest should ultimately be centered on market discipline. By being forced to pay a significant price for the negative externalities SIFIs generate – in the form of systemic risk – managers and boards will have to draw their own conclusions regarding optimum institutional strategy and structure in the context of the microeconomics and industrial organization of global financial intermediation. If this fails, constraints on their size, complexity and interconnectedness will be a major part of the policy reaction to the next financial crisis.