Voluntary Choices in Concerted Deals: The Menu Approach to Debt Reduction in Developing Countries

This article examines the mechanics and attributes of concerteddebt reduction agreements that offer creditors a choice betweenexit and relending options. The menu approach sets prices fordifferent choices that implement a decentralized equilibrium.When banks can commit to choose from the menu and are not allowedto free ride, a menu can be designed that assures that the pricepaid for debt repurchased is equal to the marginal value ofthe debt claims. This can be achieved by taxing the gains thataccrue to nonexiters with a request for new money. The equilibriumamount of debt reduction rises when the new money request isincreased. The importance of banks' heterogeneity for menusto dominate simple concerted buybacks and the case in whichdebt reduction can be financed by loans from international financialinstitutions are discussed.     

How International Exchange, Technology, and Institutions Affect Workers: An Introduction

In a world of deepening trade links, rapid technological change,and weakening institutions, workers in rich and poor countriesalike are concerned about their incomes and the security oftheir work. In contrast to the substantial quantity of analysison industrial countries, relatively little careful work hasbeen done on these issues in developing countries, especiallyin the context of the recent globalization of economic relations.Empirical work suggests that disequalizing trends in some developingcountries may have been caused by the entry of low-income countriessuch as China into world production or by the greater qualityand technological requirements of contemporary trade in goods.Whatever the source, these results raise questions about theviability of institutional mechanisms for supporting the incomesecurity and working conditions of workers. Many labor marketregulations are already ineffective owing to weak enforcementcapabilities. However, in most developing countries, there willbe a rising fraction of workers in formal labor contracts, risingdemands for formal mechanisms for dealing with income insecurity,and a potentially larger role for unions in an important segmentof the work force. Thus, it is of increasing importance to setthe policy and institutional framework in a fashion that isboth consistent with competitive pressures and supportive ofworkers' participation and security.     

Policy Selectivity Forgone: Debt and Donor Behavior in Africa

We assess the dynamics behind the high net resource transfersby donors and creditors to Sub-Saharan African countries. Analyzingthe determinants of overall net transfers for a panel of 37recipient countries in 1978–98, we find that country policiesmattered little. Donors—especially bilateral donors—actuallymade greater transfers to countries with high debt, largelyowed to multilateral creditors, when policies were "bad." Weconclude that comprehensive debt relief has the potential, thoughnot the certainty, to restore selectivity in support of goodpolicies. That would make development assistance more effectivegoing forward—and increase public support in donor countries.     

Investment Incentives: New Money, Debt Relief, and the Critical Role of Conditionality in the Debt Crisis

External debt depresses investment and lowers economic growthbelow its potential through its negative effect on liquidityand expected profitability. These effects can pull a countryinto a downward spiral in which both the debtor country andcreditors lose. This article considers the possibilities forrevising contracts between a debtor and its creditors once adebt crisis has erupted. The framework that we develop showshow various combinations of new money and cuts in debt and debtservice affect a debtor country's welfare, its debt repayments,and the earnings of its creditors. The analysis distinguishesbetween debtor countries that are willing and able to precommitcredibly to an adjustment program and those that are not. Thisdistinction provides the basis for a discussion of conditionallending by the international financial institutions to provideincentives and sanctions that make credible a debtor's promisesto invest.