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11.
Rolando F. Peláez 《Journal of Economics and Finance》2005,29(1):127-137
This paper presents a logit model for dating business-cycle turning points. The regressors are monthly series from the Business
Cycle Indicators database of the Conference Board. Dividing the sample period into a subset for model initialization (1959∶9–1970∶12)
and a subset for testing (1971∶1–2003∶12) yields a chronology that is nearly identical to that established by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, the recognition lag is less than four months, in contrast to an average of more
than eleven months for the official chronology. (JEL E320)
The author is grateful for comments by an anonymous referee. 相似文献
12.
Diánez-González Juan Pablo Camelo-Ordaz Carmen Fernández-Alles Mariluz 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2021,17(2):1007-1035
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper has been designed with a dual goal. On the one hand, the paper aims to examine the role of management teams, industry agents, and... 相似文献
13.
We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there
is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for
a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable,
as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification
have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance,
which performance is not significantly different between them. 相似文献
14.
John?K.?StranlundEmail author Christopher?Costello Carlos?A.?Chávez 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,28(2):181-204
We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871. 相似文献
15.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
16.
János Gács 《Empirica》1994,21(1):83-104
The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget. 相似文献
17.
This paper presents a model of the interactions between natural resources and physical capital in the evolution of a tourist destination. The projected trajectory of the number of tourists approaches the classical lifecycle pattern. The post-stagnation phase is analyzed within the model, obtaining different patterns which depend on the impacts of physical capital on both demand and environmental degradation. The magnitudes of these impacts are determined by the type of tourism. An empirical application to the case of the tourist industry in the Canary Islands (Spain) is presented, showing that the model can represent the general characteristics of the post-stagnation phase of a tourist destination. 相似文献
18.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
19.
Tamás Rudas 《Quality and Quantity》1991,25(4):345-358
The present paper considers some new models for the analysis of multidimensional contigency tables. Although the theoretical background used here appeared already in Haberman (1974), prescribed conditional interaction (PCIN) models were introduced by Rudas (1987) and their mathematical properties were worked out by Leimer and Rudas (1988). These models are defined by prescribing the values of certain conditional interactions in the contingency table. Conditional interaction is defined here as the logarithm of an appropriately defined conditional odds ratio. This conditional odds ratio is a conditional version of a generalization of the well known odds ratio of a 2×2 table and that of the three factor interaction term of a 2×2×2 table and applies to any number of dimensions and any number of categories of the variables. The well known log-linear (LL) models are special PCIN models. Estimated frequencies under PCIN models and tests of fit can be computed using existing statistical software (e.g. BMDP). The paper describes the class of PCIN models and compares it to the class of association models of Goodman (1981). As LL models are widely used in the analysis of social mobility tables, application of more general PCIN models is illustrated. 相似文献
20.
A bstract . The actions of government fall into two types: taxes (the taking of property ) and expenditures (the awarding of gifts ). Politicians profit as long as the value of resources raised from taxation exceeds the cost of expenditures. From their point of view, fiscal efficiency consists in maximizing the support obtained by spending and minimizing the opposition generated by taxing. This is accomplished by spending on well-organized groups and taxing the uninformed public. This results in the "iron law of political redistribution" in which income and wealth are transferred from the latter to the former. In a hierarchical State , it is usually profitable for those at the top to centralize control over taxing and spending, if for no other reason than to make it difficult for politicians at lower levels to compete against them. This gives rise to the "law of hierarchical centralization "—in a hierarchical State, power becomes centralized over time. The greater the power of government, the faster this process takes place. In order to avoid this problem, one could design constitutions which are non-hierarchical in nature, in which each unit of government is completely autonomous from the others, as firms are in a free market. 相似文献