Do protest responses to a contingent valuation question and a choice experiment differ?

It is suggested that the number of protest responses in stated preference surveys depends, inter alia, on the valuation method used. Choice Experiments (CE) are said to generate a lower number of protest responses than Contingent Valuation (CV). However, no comparison of both methods with respect to protest responses has been conducted to date. We used both CE and CV in a survey on forest biodiversity in two German regions. Protest beliefs were measured for all respondents irrespective of whether they were willing to pay or not. The results show no clear pattern of differences between CE and CV regarding protest beliefs and protest responses. Using an attitude scale based on respondents’ protest beliefs, we see a significant negative effect of this attitude on willingness to pay in both methods. However, in one of the two study regions, the effect is weaker in CE than in CV.      

QUALITY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A SEMIPARAMETRIC SMOOTH COEFFICIENT ESTIMATION

This paper proposes a semiparametric smooth coefficient cost model to study the university cost structure where coefficients are an unknown function of the university's overall quality. A local least square method with a kernel weight function is used to estimate the cost function, and a simple statistic for testing a parametric model of the additive quality versus the semiparametric smooth coefficient model is applied. Empirical results from 56 universities in Taiwan show that, taking quality into account, higher education is subject to diseconomies of scale. In all categories—comprehensive and science/technology and public and private universities—the current university scale in Taiwan is too big to be cost efficient. (JEL I21, H52, 9120)     

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

Training,migration, and regional income disparities

"It is assumed that there are two regions, that production requires both skilled and unskilled labour, and that one region is innately more productive than the other. Workers, who differ in their migration or training costs, make individually rational decisions. In equilibrium the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers is always higher in the more productive region. Average incomes differ between regions because regional differences in wage rates are reinforced by regional differences in the structure of employment. The model is also used to analyse the effects of policies intended to equalize the distribution of income."     

POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN PUERTO RICO, 1969–89: TRENDS AND SOURCES

The paper examines Puerto Rican trends in income distribution during the 1970s and 1980s, then attempts to ascertain the source of the changes in income inequality through a decomposition of the Gini coefficient by factor income source. The study finds that poverty and inequality declined unambiguously during the twenty-year period. The source of the fall in income concentration was found to have been tied, not to changes in the distribution or share of earned income, but to that of unearned income, particularly transfers. These appear to have also accounted for the decline in poverty.     

MISUSE AND USE OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AS A WELFARE INDICATOR: SELECTED ANALYTICAL AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES

Few economic relationships have been as scrutinized as that between SNA measures of national product, investment and consumption, and welfare. The present paper contrasts SNA economic production and welfare to total production and welfare within the Walrasian framework of usefulness and costliness. An evaluation of deductions and additions to the SNA made by Nordhaus-Tobin, Zolotas, Richard and Nancy Ruggles, Kendrick, Eisner and Jorgenson-Fraumeni, in their research on extended product and income accounts and improved indicators of welfare reveals numerous unresolved analytical and measurement issues; and reaffirms the usefulness of the SNA as a fundamental, initial, welfare indicator.     

All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy

The rules of behavior for the monetary authorities changed in 1933 and 1947 and the Fed temporarily changed its operating procedures in 1979, but these changes did not alter the fact that the monetary authorities serve as the agent of the fiscal authorities. On the fiscal side, a shift from a centralized process to one where Congress was composed of a set of individual entrepreneurs altered the fiscal focus from the national economy to one of localized interests. This change led to a more autoregressive and deficit-prone federal budget and changed the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. It also elevated the status of monetary policy to the extent where financial markets react to every utterance from the monetary authorities.     

Information Shocks and the Dynamics of the Housing Market*

In this paper, we analyze housing‐market reactions to the release of previously unpublished information on school quality. Using high‐quality housing data, which precisely bracket the timing of the information shock, we investigate housing‐price dynamics within school‐catchment areas. We find a robust short‐term housing‐market reaction to the publication of school‐quality indicators, suggesting that this information was new to the households, and that households are willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to pre‐publication levels after two to three months.