Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Domestic Support and Border Measures for Processed Horticultural Products

In horticultural markets, trade barriers often apply to the processed products whereas domestic support applies to farm-produced raw commodities. Here we assess the effects of such trade barriers and domestic support by simulating the effects of policy reform on global processing tomato markets, which are faced with modest processed product tariffs and high domestic support in the European Union (EU). Both protection and EU subsidy drive down world welfare, but we find that reducing import tariffs for tomato products would yield greater effects on markets and larger welfare impacts outside Europe than would reductions in EU domestic support.     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Social Capital and the Terms of Trade for Farmland

Social capital is a person or group's sympathy for or sense of obligation to another person or group. This article introduces social capital into a neoclassical model of farmland exchange and shows how relationships alter the terms of trade. Empirical evidence from a survey of farmers shows that the type of relationship farmland sellers have with farmland buyers has a statistically significant and economically important effect on the minimum-sell price for farmland. Compared to the minimum-sell price when selling to a total stranger in an arm's-length transaction, farmland sellers discount prices to friendly neighbors and relatives and require a premium from unfriendly neighbors and influential people in the community.     

Punishment in environmental protection

The fundamental character of a punishment is the subject of this paper. Based on the assumed function of a punishment (deterrent), a punishment has to be perceived and experienced to be an adverse result by the punished and the public. The first factor in particular means that the courts have to have flexibility to sentence a person to such a punishment that is experienced as such. The legal question becomes how this customization of a punishment is acceptable from an equality standpoint. In the field of environmental protection, the administrative process poses serious problems. There may be administrative proceedings that result in substantial economic losses for individuals and groups alike. Jürgen S. Poesche was born in Edmonton (Alberta, Canada), lived in Europe and North America and graduated from the Helsinki University of Technology, University of Helsinki, Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration and Tampere University of Technology. Areas of interest include chemical and mechanical pulping, environmental protection (EIA, environmental ethics, environmental law), and capital investment decision-making. He has published in, e.g., Wochenblatt für Papierfabrikation, Finnish Journal of Business Economics, Ympäristojuridiikka (Environmental Law), and in the publication series of the Helsinki University of Technology and the Tampere University of Technology. Presently, he is working for a major Canadian forest products company.     

Evidence on the motivation for management forecasts of corporate earnings

A multivariate model of the process by which managers decide to release public forecasts of their firms' earnings is developed, based on factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for and the willingness to supply such forecasts. We test the model on data from a comprehensive sample of earnings forecasts, and find support for our hypotheses about the likely joint influence of those factors. Larger firm size, greater leverage, higher and more stable earnings rates and less rapid growth rates are found to be associated with an increased propensity for management to provide earnings forecasts for their firms.     

Competitive decision making: Two and a half frames

We argue that the study of competitive decision making has been heavily influenced by the frames of reference that are adopted by researchers. The dominant economic frame and the emergent behavioral frame describe largely separate phenomena and have little overlap. Drawing from examples of learning in games and markets, we show how each of these frames falls short of capturing some interesting elements in competitive decisions. We then describe how a coevolutionary perspective may be emerging as an integrative paradigm for the study of competitive decisions.This paper was prepared for the conference, Understanding Competitive Decision Making. Comments by the participants of that conference and Paul Shoemaker are gratefully acknowledged, as are discussions with Colin Camerer, Eldar Shafir, and Sharoni Shafir.