Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation

This paper provides an economics-based interpretation of the standard finding in the literature that democracies rarely fight each other. A general theory of conflict between two countries is presented and empirical analysis applies this theory to the question of why democracies rarely fight each other. The results show that the fundamental factor in causing bilateral cooperation is trade. Countries seek to protect wealth gained through international trade, therefore trading partners are less combative than nontrading nations. Democratic dyads trade more than nondemocratic dyads, and thus exhibit less conflict and more cooperation.     

Embedded economics: The irrelevance of Christian fictive domestic economy

When reading the New Testament, the modern historically-minded interpreter would do well to keep in view that early Christian traditions emerged in the advanced agrarian societies of the first-century, eastern Mediterranean. In these societies, kinship and political institutions, roles, and norms determined economic and religious institutional behavior. That is, religious and economic structures were always embedded in either the kin group or the political group. Hence, to understand the “economic” assumptions and behaviors described in the New Testament, the interpreter must develop scenarios that fit the document’s historical and social context; the alternative is a necessarily anachronistic and ethnocentric reading. This essay articulates some basic perspectives entailed in historically and culturally sensitive interpretations of Old Testament and New Testament passages dealing with “economics”. The methodology employed here is a broadly based “social scientific criticism,” focusing on reading theory and cultural anthropology.     

BINGE DRINKING IN COLLEGE: THE IMPACT OF PRICE, AVAILABILITY, AND ALCOHOL CONTROL POLICIES

This paper estimates the effects of beer prices, alcohol availability, and policies related to driving under the influence of alcohol on drinking and binge drinking among youths and young adults. Data are from a nationally representative survey of students in U.S. colleges and universities. Separate estimates are obtained for underage male and female students, as well as for older male and female students. The estimates indicate that the drinking practices of male college students are generally insensitive to the price of beer. However, underage drinking and binge drinking by female students do respond significantly to price, although both are relatively inelastic. The results also show that strong drunk driving policies targeting youths and young adults significantly reduce drinking and binge drinking by male students. Similarly, these policies reduce drinking among female college students but appear to have little impact on their binge drinking. Instead, the results indicate that many elements of campus life (including participation in a fraternity or sorority, living on campus, and the ready availability of alcoholic beverages) are among the most important determinants of drinking and binge drinking among college students.     

All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy

The rules of behavior for the monetary authorities changed in 1933 and 1947 and the Fed temporarily changed its operating procedures in 1979, but these changes did not alter the fact that the monetary authorities serve as the agent of the fiscal authorities. On the fiscal side, a shift from a centralized process to one where Congress was composed of a set of individual entrepreneurs altered the fiscal focus from the national economy to one of localized interests. This change led to a more autoregressive and deficit-prone federal budget and changed the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. It also elevated the status of monetary policy to the extent where financial markets react to every utterance from the monetary authorities.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Unmanaged care?

Changes in the health care marketplace have outpaced many of the laws and regulations that were intended to protect patients. Consumer advocates want new safeguards, but employers and the managed care industry warn that could raise the cost of coverage.