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981.
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification:
J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
982.
This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses. 相似文献
983.
Joïlle Noailly Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh Cees A. Withagen 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):183-200
Abstract. Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters
are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current
paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that individual
harvesters face a choice between two harvesting strategies. The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population
is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits
are demanded more than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part
in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex
dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system and analyzes dynamic
paths to the equilibrium. In addition, effects of changes in prices are analyzed. A main result of the paper is that under
certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.
Correspondence to: J. Noailly 相似文献
984.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
985.
Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout
the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual
authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported.
We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous
referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been
possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility. 相似文献
986.
Capitalism's growth imperative 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A capitalist firm operating in a competitive market is subjectto a growth imperative, because uncertainty about the profitrate under a no-growth policy makes the firm's prospects highlyunattractive in finite time and bankruptcy practically certainin the long run. A no-growth policy determines consumption andinvestment so that they and capital would remain constant overtime if the latter's expected return were realised with certainty.Simulation is used to arrive at the probability of bankruptcyby the end of t periods and the expected values of capital andmoney, for relevant combinations of time and uncertainty undersuccessively more realistic models of a no-growth firm in acompetitive market. The sensitivity of the results to variationin the parameters in each of the models is evaluated. Finally,we establish that a plausible growth policy may achieve growth,but the problem of bankruptcy is not resolved. 相似文献
987.
Kenneth J. Arrow Partha Dasgupta Karl-Göran Mäler 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,26(4):647-685
We are interested in three related questions:(1) How should accounting prices be estimated?(2) How should we evaluate policy change in animperfect economy? (3) How can we check whetherintergenerational well-being will be sustainedalong a projected economic programme? We do notpresume that the economy is convex, nor do weassume that the government optimizes on behalfof its citizens. We show that the same set ofaccounting prices should be used both forpolicy evaluation and for assessing whether ornot intergenerational welfare along a giveneconomic path will be sustained. We also showthat a comprehensive measure of wealth,computed in terms of the accounting prices, canbe used as an index for problems (2) and (3)above. The remainder of the paper is concernedwith rules for estimating the accounting pricesof several specific environmental naturalresources, transacted in a few well knowneconomic institutions. 相似文献
988.
Abstract. Many countries promote tourism as a device for earning foreign exchange and promoting domestic welfare and growth. In all these countries the non-traded goods (internationally not traded) are consumed by both domestic residents and tourists. It is well known that the relative price of non-traded goods and services is determined in the local market – hence the tourist demand results in monopoly power in trade for the host country. We use a very simple two-country model to demonstrate the specific nature of the offer curve and the trade equilibrium and the difficulties of taxation. 相似文献
989.
J. Christophe Bureau Nancy H. Chau Rolf Färe Shawna Grosskopf 《Review of Development Economics》2003,7(4):527-542
The paper addresses the question of whether trade restrictiveness impacts economic performance, via a trade restrictiveness index that is decomposable into a trade distortion and a domestic distortion component. The paper builds on the Anderson and Neary price index measure of trade distortion, in evaluating trade restrictiveness via a distance function approach. This is accomplished by adding a “dual” version to their trade restrictiveness price index, based on distance functions that scale output quantities. The authors compute the trade restrictiveness quantity index (TRQI) using a parametric frontier approach to model the production side of the economy, and a panel of information on the agricultural sector of a set of European Community countries. The results suggest that the use of TRQI makes a considerable difference to interpretations of the efficiency impact of agricultural trade policies in EC countries, as compared to policy‐oriented aggregates or result‐oriented measures of trade restrictiveness. 相似文献
990.
Why do charitable nonprofit, service‐providing organizations save? What are the tradeoffs between using income to build up cash reserves and serving more clients? Saving may generate income, protect the organization against a drop in donations, and increase the organization's chances of survival. Saving, though, may affect the likelihood that nonprofits receive private and public funding. We model the relationship among private and public income, economic conditions, and nonprofit savings. We find that anticipation of government help during difficult times tends to reduce the amount of saving done by the nonprofit. This effect is strengthened if government officials view unspent donations as indicative of a lack of need. Both these effects provide a strong incentive for nonprofits to spend on current consumption rather than to save for the future, and thus to increase the burden on the public purse. 相似文献