Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

We study how investor sentiment affects the cross‐section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning‐of‐period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non‐dividend‐paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.     

Predicting Returns with Managerial Decision Variables: Is There a Small‐Sample Bias?

Many studies find that aggregate managerial decision variables, such as aggregate equity issuance, predict stock or bond market returns. Recent research argues that these findings may be driven by an aggregate time‐series version of Schultz's (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483–517) pseudo market‐timing bias. Using standard simulation techniques, we find that the bias is much too small to account for the observed predictive power of the equity share in new issues, corporate investment plans, insider trading, dividend initiations, or the maturity of corporate debt issues.     

A Multiperiod Model and Experimental Evidence of Independence and “Lowballing”*

Abstract. Auditors, regulators, and academics are interested in the pricing practice of “lowballing” and its relationship to auditor independence. Several analytical models have examined these issues. However, these theories have gone untested primarily due to a lack of field data concerning important environmental variables. In this study, a multiperiod model of lowballing and independence is developed and tested in laboratory markets via the experimental economics methodology. The study contributes to the literature in two respects. First, it represents one of the first studies providing empirical evidence and theory testing of the relationship between lowballing and independence. Second, the model presents a new rationale for low-ball pricing and its relationship to auditor independence. Lowballing and impairment of independence, occurring without exogenous transaction costs, are caused by positing cross-sectional variation in audit cost and quality and an informational advantage that accrues to an incumbent auditor-client pair regarding future variation in these audit dimensions. The model is operationalized in a multiperiod laboratory market consisting of multiple sellers and buyers. Sixteen markets are conducted to test price and reporting predictions of the model. The markets strongly exhibit lowballing behavior, but the exact price predictions are generally not supported. The markets also support reporting predictions, with sellers deviating from truthful reporting (impairing their independence) only when additional future profits are greater than the additional cost of misreporting. Data availability. The laboratory market data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.     

Unionization in Australia: Evidence from the AWIRS*

This article uses workplace level data from the recent Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey to test a simple demand and supply model explaining the level of union membership within Australia The findings suggest that previous research using individual-level data has understated the importance of the supply-side in influencing union membership. In particular, unionization levels were found to be highly sensitive to firm size, to the number of unions represented in the workplace and to management attitudes     

The Development of Secondary Market Liquidity for NYSE-Listed IPOs

For NYSE‐listed IPOs, limit order submissions and depth relative to volume are unusually low on the first trading day. Initial buy‐side liquidity is higher for IPOs with high‐quality underwriters, large syndicates, low insider sales, and high premarket demand, while sell‐side liquidity is higher for IPOs that represent a large fraction of outstanding shares and have low premarket demand. Our results suggest that uncertainty and offer design affect initial liquidity, though order flow stabilizes quickly. We also find that submission strategies are influenced by expected underwriter stabilization and preopening order flow contains information about both initial prices and subsequent returns.     

Determinants of Salary Dispersion in Organizations

Data from 821 colleges and universities were used to examine the determinants of the degree of wage dispersion in a set of more than 70 high-level university positions. Salary dispersion was positively related to the amount of dispersion in job tenure, private control, and type of institution (two-year college, four-year college, or university). Salary dispersion was negatively related to the proportion of administrative positions filled by insiders and to homogeneity in gender composition. The number of administrative positions (an index of the degree of specialization) increases dispersion when the positions were of a general administrative nature but decreased dispersion when position proliferation was related to the core activities of teaching and research.     

IS THE MARKET FAILING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS WHO WISH TO MANAGE RISKS?

The variability of producers ‘net income levels is largely a function of variability in output price, yield, and input prices. Yet, the tools available to manage price risk and yield risk are not widely used by producers. Is the market failing to provide agricultural producers with effective risk management tools? To identify producers’ needs, the paper establishes the relative importance of price and yield risk by decomposing the variability of revenues from a sample of crops in California agriculture. The risk tools available to producers of those commodities are compared to producers needs for tools. Results indicate that “market failure” is readily apparent in markets for tools to manage risks. However, the nature of these missing or incomplete markets does not necessarily imply inefficiencies that would justify government intervention.