Employee Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy

An employee's annual earnings fall by 13% in the first full calendar year after her firm's bankruptcy, and the present value of lost earnings from bankruptcy to six years following bankruptcy is 87% of pre-bankruptcy annual earnings. More worker earnings are lost in thin labor markets and among small firms. Ex ante compensating wage differentials for this “bankruptcy risk” are up to 2% of firm value for a firm whose credit rating falls from AA to BBB, comparable in magnitude to debt tax benefits. Thus, wage premia for expected costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently large to be an important consideration in capital structure decisions.     

Competition and Misconduct

Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.     

M&As AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF TNCs

Most of the motivations for M&As that feature in the global strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs) are a means of reshaping competitive advantages within their respective industries. They have some effect on the TNCs of all or most industries and so to that extent they are not necessarily sector‐specific. However, it may be that some of the motives which we outline affect some industries more than others, and in that sense they can be expected to be associated with a greater intensity of M&As in certain sectors than others. We identify the likelihood of M&As across industries, and discuss how the general factors that have promoted the recent M&A wave have had a bigger impact on the global strategies of TNCs in the industries in which the propensity to engage in M&As has been the highest. The regional dimension is also considered.     

Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud?

In the $793 billion Paycheck Protection Program, we examine metrics related to potential misreporting including nonregistered businesses, multiple businesses at residential addresses, abnormally high implied compensation per employee, and large inconsistencies with jobs reported in another government program. These measures consistently concentrate in certain FinTech lenders and are cross-verified by seven additional measures. FinTech market share increased significantly over time, and suspicious lending by FinTechs in 2021 is four times the level at the start of the program. Suspicious loans are being overwhelmingly forgiven at rates similar to other loans.     

Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.     

Naïve Buying Diversification and Narrow Framing by Individual Investors

We provide the first tests to distinguish whether individual investors equally balance their overall portfolios (naïve portfolio diversification, NPD) or, in contrast, equally balance the values of same-day purchases of multiple assets (naïve buying diversification, NBD). We find NBD in purchases of multiple stocks, and in mixed purchases of individual stocks and funds. In contrast, there is little evidence of NPD. Evidence suggests that NBD arises due to stock picking behavior and neglect of diversification. These findings suggest that behavioral finance theory should incorporate transaction, as well as portfolio, framing.     

Who Owns What? A Factor Model for Direct Stockholding

We build a cross-sectional factor model for investors' direct stockholdings and estimate it using data from almost 10 million retail accounts in the Indian stock market. Our model identifies strong investor clienteles for stock characteristics, most notably firm age and share price, and for particular clusters of stock characteristics. These clienteles are intuitively associated with investor attributes such as account age, size, and diversification. Coheld stocks tend to have higher return covariance, inconsistent with simple models of diversification but suggestive that clientele demands influence stock returns.     

Do Municipal Bond Dealers Give Their Customers “Fair and Reasonable” Pricing?

Municipal bonds exhibit considerable retail pricing variation, even for same-size trades of the same bond on the same day, and even from the same dealer. Markups vary widely across dealers. Trading strongly clusters on eighth price increments, and clustered trades exhibit higher markups. Yields are often lowered to just above salient numbers. Machine learning estimates exploiting the richness of the data show that dealers that use strategic pricing have systematically higher markups. Recent Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules have had only a limited impact on markups. While a subset of dealers focus on best execution, many dealers appear focused on opportunistic pricing.     

Is COVID Revealing a Virus in CMBS 2.0?

Commercial loan valuations crucially depend on accurate loan income, but underwritten income on commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) loans is commonly overstated relative to actual property income. Consistent with these differences being originator-specific, income overstatement in CMBS 2.0 deals varies widely and persistently across originators, is priced by originators, is related across property types within an originator, is predictable ex ante, and is accompanied by inflation of past financials. Risk retention and associated regulation had no discernible effect on income overstatement. Originator income overstatement is highly predictive of pre- and COVID-period loan distress. Overall, recent market stresses reveal large systemic differences in underwriting standards across originators.