POLITICALLY REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION WITH INSPECTION: THE EQUITY-HONESTY-WELFARE TRADE-OFF

We study dominant strategy mechanisms where the planner knows the distribution of types and the agents are instructed to announce their types to the planner. It is assumed that the planner has access to a technology of inspection which is costly but perfect, and that he can penalize an agent who is inspected after announcements have been made if he is found to have lied about his type. It shall be shown that, in general, the welfare-maximizing mechanism that respects minimal equity will induce some agents to lie about their types.     

Properties of Economic Income in a Private Information Setting*

Abstract. This paper adopts a valuation perspective within an asymmetric information setting and explores properties of economic income. The optimal intertemporal contract induces an accrual component of income which would not exist absent the information problem. The contracting solution introduces a dampening effect—if cash flow increases by one dollar, income increases by less than one dollar. Thus, the accrual is inversely related to cash flows. Further, this dampening is greater for more favorable cash outcomes. Résumé. Les auteurs adoptent la perspective de l'évaluation en situation d'asymétrie de l'information et explorent les propriétés du bénéfice économique. Le contrat intertemporel optimal fait intervenir une amplification du bénéfice qui n'existerait pas si ce n'était de la présence du problème d'information. La solution contractuelle amène un effet atténuateur — c'est-à-dire qu'à une augmentation du flux monétaire de un dollar correspond une augmentation du bénéfice de moins de un dollar. Ainsi, l'amplification est en relation inverse avec les flux monétaires. En outre, l'atténuation est plus marquée dans le cas de résultats monétaires plus avantageux.     

Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis

Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Recent experimental evidence supports the theory, as students' behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion (MLA). Yet, much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision‐making, these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals. Using traders recruited from the CBOT, we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students, but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted, we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a greater extent than students.     

BASKET PEGS AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHANGE: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE MID‐SEVENTIES*

The adoption of a basket peg by China in July 2005 raised interest in this form of exchange rate regime. This paper explores the emergence of the basket peg in the early 1970s, using New Zealand and Australia as case studies to examine why it was adopted, how it operated, and their policy‐makers' use of it to influence various goals. We highlight the complexity of regime choice following the collapse of Bretton Woods. For Australia and New Zealand, the basket peg was a plausible (although interim) solution when they were reluctant either to peg to a single currency or float.