FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

THE EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET ENTRY OF PHYSICIAN‐OWNED HOSPITALS ON MEDICARE EXPENDITURES: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES APPROACH

This study examines the effect of physician‐owned hospitals (POHs) on Medicare per enrollee expenditures at the metropolitan area (MSA) level nationwide, spanning the 8‐year time period from 1998 to 2005. The study uses fixed effects panel data estimation with instrumental variables to account for the bias introduced by endogenous POH market entry (i.e., POHs may be more likely to open in high‐growth/high‐demand markets with high levels of Medicare per enrollee expenditures). After controlling for other variables that are likely to affect expenditures (especially the age and sex distribution of the MSA), we find no association between POH presence and Medicare expenditures per enrollee at the MSA level. The results are robust to changes in model specification, estimation technique, and definition of geographic market. These findings suggest that the “demand inducement” aspects of physician ownership of acute care hospitals (if any) have no meaningful impact on market‐level Medicare expenditures per enrollee. Current policies based on an assumption that POHs are associated with significant increases in total expenditures may need to be reassessed. (JEL I11, L10, C33)     

Competition and Misconduct

Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.     

Employee Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy

An employee's annual earnings fall by 13% in the first full calendar year after her firm's bankruptcy, and the present value of lost earnings from bankruptcy to six years following bankruptcy is 87% of pre-bankruptcy annual earnings. More worker earnings are lost in thin labor markets and among small firms. Ex ante compensating wage differentials for this “bankruptcy risk” are up to 2% of firm value for a firm whose credit rating falls from AA to BBB, comparable in magnitude to debt tax benefits. Thus, wage premia for expected costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently large to be an important consideration in capital structure decisions.     

M&As AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF TNCs

Most of the motivations for M&As that feature in the global strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs) are a means of reshaping competitive advantages within their respective industries. They have some effect on the TNCs of all or most industries and so to that extent they are not necessarily sector‐specific. However, it may be that some of the motives which we outline affect some industries more than others, and in that sense they can be expected to be associated with a greater intensity of M&As in certain sectors than others. We identify the likelihood of M&As across industries, and discuss how the general factors that have promoted the recent M&A wave have had a bigger impact on the global strategies of TNCs in the industries in which the propensity to engage in M&As has been the highest. The regional dimension is also considered.     

Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud?

In the $793 billion Paycheck Protection Program, we examine metrics related to potential misreporting including nonregistered businesses, multiple businesses at residential addresses, abnormally high implied compensation per employee, and large inconsistencies with jobs reported in another government program. These measures consistently concentrate in certain FinTech lenders and are cross-verified by seven additional measures. FinTech market share increased significantly over time, and suspicious lending by FinTechs in 2021 is four times the level at the start of the program. Suspicious loans are being overwhelmingly forgiven at rates similar to other loans.     

Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.     

Naïve Buying Diversification and Narrow Framing by Individual Investors

We provide the first tests to distinguish whether individual investors equally balance their overall portfolios (naïve portfolio diversification, NPD) or, in contrast, equally balance the values of same-day purchases of multiple assets (naïve buying diversification, NBD). We find NBD in purchases of multiple stocks, and in mixed purchases of individual stocks and funds. In contrast, there is little evidence of NPD. Evidence suggests that NBD arises due to stock picking behavior and neglect of diversification. These findings suggest that behavioral finance theory should incorporate transaction, as well as portfolio, framing.     

Who Owns What? A Factor Model for Direct Stockholding

We build a cross-sectional factor model for investors' direct stockholdings and estimate it using data from almost 10 million retail accounts in the Indian stock market. Our model identifies strong investor clienteles for stock characteristics, most notably firm age and share price, and for particular clusters of stock characteristics. These clienteles are intuitively associated with investor attributes such as account age, size, and diversification. Coheld stocks tend to have higher return covariance, inconsistent with simple models of diversification but suggestive that clientele demands influence stock returns.     

Is COVID Revealing a Virus in CMBS 2.0?

Commercial loan valuations crucially depend on accurate loan income, but underwritten income on commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) loans is commonly overstated relative to actual property income. Consistent with these differences being originator-specific, income overstatement in CMBS 2.0 deals varies widely and persistently across originators, is priced by originators, is related across property types within an originator, is predictable ex ante, and is accompanied by inflation of past financials. Risk retention and associated regulation had no discernible effect on income overstatement. Originator income overstatement is highly predictive of pre- and COVID-period loan distress. Overall, recent market stresses reveal large systemic differences in underwriting standards across originators.