Pareto-Improving Redistribution in a Monopoly

This paper discusses the impact of income transfers between consumers of a monopoly. In this context, redistributing the incomes could induce an increase of the demand elasticity which leads to a lower monopoly price, beneficial to any consumer. Under mild assumptions on the demand function, we prove the existence of a transfer maximizing the market coverage which remains advantageous for any contributing consumer. It is proved that the producer is also better off. Then the transfer is Pareto-improving. In the linear demand case, analytical results are found. Extensions to Cournot oligopoly and natural monopoly pricing are considered.
JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D64, H2, L13     

New Salary Functions for Pension Valuations

Abstract

This paper investigates salary functions as used in the valuation of pension plans. Pension actuaries as well as researchers in actuarial science may find many of the ideas in this article useful. The main conclusion of this paper is that salary functions, as derived from the parametric models, yield gains and losses that can be quite small and, in some cases, less variable than nonparametric methods. This paper starts by defining the salary function as an accumulation function based on inflation and merit. Next, we investigate traditional estimation methods in the context of this definition. We then present a parametric age-based model for the salary function and compare it with a parametric service-based model. Finally, we apply real pension plan data to derive age-and service-based salary functions and, through the use of two funding methods, investigate how these salary functions affect salary gains and losses.     

HIGH AND LOW EARNINGS JOBS: THE FORTUNES OF EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS

The focus of the literature on the effect of job changes has been on the consequences of job destruction on the individual worker. In this paper we analyze the impact on the earnings distribution of both job creation and job destruction. We establish a link between job reallocation and the movement of workers into and out of the tails of the earnings distribution. Both job creating and job destroying employers shed jobs mostly from the middle and lower tails of the earnings distribution, although this is cyclically very sensitive. Labor mobility (triggered by job reallocation) is risky: mobile workers will generally end up in the upper or lower tail of the distribution rather than in the middle. If workers move across industry boundaries, they typically move to the lower tails of the distribution. In sum, the fortunes of workers depend on the fortunes of their employers.     

A new method for constructing scenarios

Scenario construction has been the method used in France in a number of studies that relate to regional development planning problems. This article describes how this peculiarly French interpretation of the method is built upon an assessment of a system of elements and their relationship—which forms the dynamic base—and hypotheses concerning external restraints. The progression in such a scenario is developed largely from the consideration of qualitative elements, and images of the future can then be worked out at cross-sections in time. In this way, trend scenarios reveal what is unacceptable and encourage the study of alternative developments.     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.