Developing a cost-benefit analysis process for small-to-moderate expenditure decisions

During the Reagan administration, the federal government mandated the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) for regulatory decisions involving $100 million or more. While the use of CBAs has increased, less attention has been given to CBA processes involving smaller expenditures (regulatory and nonregulatory). As the federal budget tightens in the years ahead, the need to make hard decisions about these policies, programs, and technologies will increase. This paper describes a CBA process developed for the Office of Strategic Planning of the Social Security Administration; it was designed to handle small-to-moderate expenditure decisions (or for preliminary estimates of larger undertakings). A sample CBA using this process is provided, along with a discussion of the lessons that were learned from an initial application.     

Initial Public Offerings: CFO Perceptions

We examine four issues pertaining to initial public offerings (IPOs) using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs). First, why do firms go public? Second, is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? Third, what concerns CFOs about going public? Fourth, do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? Results support funding for growth and liquidity as the primary reasons for IPOs. CFO sentiment is generally stationary in pre‐ and post‐bubble years. Managers are concerned with the direct costs of going public, such as underwriting fees, as well as indirect costs. We find a negative relation between a focus on immediate growth and long‐term abnormal returns.     

On the Implications of the Internet for Insurance Markets and Institutions

By most accounts, the Internet and related advances in information technology significantly affect financial services in general and insurance markets and institutions in particular. Coupled with other important trends such as globalization and regulatory reform, these changes are forcing far‐reaching changes upon the insurance industry and making it more competitive. This article focuses specifically on the implications of the Internet for insurance markets and institutions. The conventional wisdom that the Internet constitutes a sufficient condition for the disintermediation of traditional insurance distribution networks is called into question. To the extent that the Internet reduces transaction costs, it will create opportunities for new intermediaries as well as for existing ones. It will also influence product design, in some cases making it economically attractive to unbundle and repackage various forms of coverage. By removing entry barriers and reducing insurance costs, the Internet will also provide a private market solution to a major insurance regulatory concern—enhancing insurance affordability and availability.     

Parallel sourcing and supplier performance in the Japanese automobile industry

Japanese auto makers are reported to enjoy high supplier performance through long-term relationships, specific investments, and sole sourcing. Quality management consultants in the U.S. have been strongly advocating adoption of these practices. But economic and management theorists would predict that the combination of a high level of relationship-specific investments and sole sourcing will lead to problems with supplier performance. In fact the Japanese auto makers use a hybrid form of organization we term parallel sourcing. We present a transaction costs model that shows how parallel sourcing provides incentives for supplier performance associated with multiple sourcing while preserving claimed benefits of sole sourcing.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

A model of fractional cointegration, and tests for cointegration using the bootstrap

The paper proposes a framework for modelling cointegration in fractionally integrated processes, and considers methods for testing the existence of cointegrating relationships using the parametric bootstrap. In these procedures, ARFIMA models are fitted to the data, and the estimates used to simulate the null hypothesis of non-cointegration in a vector autoregressive modelling framework. The simulations are used to estimate p-values for alternative regression-based test statistics, including the F goodness-of-fit statistic, the Durbin–Watson statistic and estimates of the residual d. The bootstrap distributions are economical to compute, being conditioned on the actual sample values of all but the dependent variable in the regression. The procedures are easily adapted to test stronger null hypotheses, such as statistical independence. The tests are not in general asymptotically pivotal, but implemented by the bootstrap, are shown to be consistent against alternatives with both stationary and nonstationary cointegrating residuals. As an example, the tests are applied to the series for UK consumption and disposable income. The power properties of the tests are studied by simulations of artificial cointegrating relationships based on the sample data. The F test performs better in these experiments than the residual-based tests, although the Durbin–Watson in turn dominates the test based on the residual d.     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.