Standardization Process of Systems Technologies: Creating a Balance between Competition and Cooperation

Many firms are experimenting with how to standardize new technologies. They may use proprietary technologies for their products and services, and let them compete in the market selection. Alternatively, they can cooperate to jointly set a standard and experiment with combinations of market process and cooperation. If firms let the market decide, they can compete with technologies and need not invest time and effort in hammering out a standard. If they do incur the costs of negotiated standardization, they may enable end users to realize the benefits of standards. A hybrid standardization process combines the advantages of both market selection and negotiated decision making. This paper presents a contingency framework to identify conditions that will affect the preferred standardization process for vendors who introduce new technologies. A major contingency that this paper points to is the systemic nature of technologies in information and communication technology industries. The more systemic the technology is (in a way to be clarified), the less likely that firms will establish a hybrid standardization process. One advantage of decomposing technology systems in smaller components (modules) is that this approach enables firms to combine market selection with negotiated selection of standards.     

Central bank transparency and market efficiency: An econometric analysis

Blinder (1998) argues that more open public disclosure of central bank policies may enhance the efficiency of markets. We examine this claim by studying whether the Federal Reserve System's 1994 policy shift toward more open disclosure improved or worsened the predictability of financial markets. Employing methods analogous to Campbell and Shiller (1991), we find that since 1994, the forecasting error has decreased for interest rates on U.S. bonds of most maturity lengths, and that the expectations hypothesis has performed better at the low end of the yield curve. These findings are inconsistent with the view that increased central bank transparency will decrease the efficiency of financial markets. The authors would like to thank participants of the 2001 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference and 2001 Missouri Economics Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of course, the author's.     

Social Scientific Explanations?

Generally valid scientific explanations of observable social phenomena are still hardly available. By applying philosophical insights generated by Quine and derived from semiotics to social research methodology three kinds of context dependencies accompanying theory formation within social science are identified. The third context dependency is mostly not attended in theory formation about social phenomena thereby producing a ``connotation fallacy', which leaves almost all social theories undetermined and fallible. These context dependencies should be taken into account in the research design and be tested for using statistical criteria comprising a new methodology presented in this article.     

Regulating Banks through Market Discipline: A Survey of the Issues

Abstract.  The interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed New Capital Accord. This paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation. We start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms. Next, a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced. We evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have. Finally, we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism. In this respect, the Basle Committee has taken the right approach.     

Daylight saving effect

Kamstra et al. [Kamstra, M.J., Kramer, L.A., Levi, M.D., 2000. Losing sleep at the market: the daylight saving anomaly. The American Economic Review 90, 1005–1011] argue that the mean weekend return following the changes in daylight saving time is less than the mean weekend return throughout the rest of the year. Opposing studies, such as Pinegar [Pinegar, J.M., 2002. Losing sleep at the market: comment. The American Economic Review 92, 1251–1256), reason that the observed results depend upon methodology. We extend the ongoing discussions by providing further evidence for equity markets and bond markets in Germany and across Europe. We further demonstrate that the daylight saving effect does not serve as a potential rationale for the weekend effect.     

Information–driven trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra–Day Data

Many observers argue that informed and insider trading is widespread in the emerging financial markets of transition countries, yet rigorous treatment of this issue has been virtually non–existent. The current paper estimates the extent of informed trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) using intra–day transaction data. Our estimates confirm that the average share of informed trading is equal to 0.32, which is high relative to developed markets and varies considerably among stocks. Using the Easley et al. (1996) approach on the very best segment of the PSE we obtained a high average probability of informed trading. Since data used in this study cover the period after the major attempts to improve market regulations, our results indicate that the PSE needs further strengthening to recover credibility and to become a real source of corporate financing. JEL classification: G14, G15.     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

The Workout of Banking Crises: A Macroeconomic Perspective

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for governmentinterventions in banking crisis. Such crisis occur when a largenumber of banks fail to meet capital requirements or are insolvent.Using a macroeconomic model with financial intermediation, ouranalyis suggests that strict enforcement of capital-adequaterules suffices in prosperous periods. Capital requirements serveas an indicator for crises interventions in critical stateswhich may require interest rate intervention and restructuringof the banking industry. These policies can be reinforced byrandom bailouts and temporary financial relief, with a largepercentage of the costs being covered by current and futureowners of banks. (JEL D41, E4, G2)