THE NUMÉRAIRE PROPERTY AND LONG‐TERM GROWTH OPTIMALITY FOR DRAWDOWN‐CONSTRAINED INVESTMENTS

We consider the portfolio choice problem for a long‐run investor in a general continuous semimartingale model. We combine the decision criterion of pathwise growth optimality with a flexible specification of attitude toward risk, encoded by a linear drawdown constraint imposed on admissible wealth processes. We define the constrained numéraire property through the notion of expected relative return and prove that drawdown‐constrained numéraire portfolio exists and is unique, but may depend on the investment horizon. However, when sampled at the times of its maximum and asymptotically as the time‐horizon becomes distant, the drawdown‐constrained numéraire portfolio is given explicitly through a model‐independent transformation of the unconstrained numéraire portfolio. The asymptotically growth‐optimal strategy is obtained as limit of numéraire strategies on finite horizons.     

THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF OPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND CONSUMPTION WITH SMALL TRANSACTION COSTS

We investigate the general structure of optimal investment and consumption with small proportional transaction costs. For a safe asset and a risky asset with general continuous dynamics, traded with random and time‐varying but small transaction costs, we derive simple formal asymptotics for the optimal policy and welfare. These reveal the roles of the investors' preferences as well as the market and cost dynamics, and also lead to a fully dynamic model for the implied trading volume. In frictionless models that can be solved in closed form, explicit formulas for the leading‐order corrections due to small transaction costs are obtained.     

Work in the Platform Economy: Beyond Lower Transaction Costs

Work on platforms is part of a wider trend towards the increasing fragmentation of work. It takes different forms, ranging from short spells of employment with the same employer to moving between different work arrangements to juggling multiple jobs at the same time. In all its forms, it signals an increasing job instability and is often fuelled by insufficient income from one job to cover the cost of living.     

What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements.     

Designing a global standardized methodology for measuring social entrepreneurship activity: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor social entrepreneurship study

Although there is a high level of practitioner, policymaker, and scholar interest in social entrepreneurship, most research is based on case studies and success stories of successful social entrepreneurs in a single country. We develop a methodology to measure population-based social entrepreneurship activity (SEA) prevalence rates and test it in 49 countries. Our results provide insights into institutional and individual drivers of SEA. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) methodology of Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), we find that countries with higher rates of traditional entrepreneurial activity also tend to have higher rates of social entrepreneurial activity. We develop a broad definition of social entrepreneurship and then explore types based on social mission, revenue model, and innovativeness.