What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements.     

Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: An Empirical Analysis

The development of the unemployment rate differs substantially between OECD countries. In this paper we investigate to what extent these differences are related to labor market institutions. In our analysis we use data of eighteen OECD countries over the period 1960–1994 and show that the way in which institutions interact is important. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2001, 15(4), pp. 403–418. Department of Economics, CentER, Tilburg University and Institute for Labour Studies (OSA), The Netherlands. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J68.     

Does the recent success of some OECD countries in lowering their unemployment rates lie in the clever design of their labor market reforms?

In recent years some OECD countries were successful in loweringthe unemployment rate substantially while other countries werenot. In this paper we investigate to what extent successfulcountries implemented a comprehensive set of institutional reforms.We present a theoretical framework to investigate the relationshipbetween unemployment and labor market institutions (LMI) suchas labor taxes, unemployment benefits, employment protection,union bargaining power and (de)centralization of bargaining.In our empirical analysis of data over the period 1960–99of 17 OECD countries we show that particular combinations ofLMI are responsible for low unemployment rates.     

The Ethical Case for Affirmative Action

Affirmative action has been a particularly contentious policy issue that has polarised contributions to the debate. Over recent times in most western countries, support for affirmative action has, however, been largely snuffed out or beaten into retreat and replaced by the concept of ‹diversity management’. Thus, any contemporary study that examines the development of affirmative action would suggest that its opponents have won the battle. Nonetheless, this article argues that because the battle has been won on dubious ethical grounds it is important that we do not allow affirmative action to sink unnoticed. This article explores and challenges the ethical and philosophical underpinnings of opponents’ views and finds their cases against affirmative action are not ethically sound. The article concludes there are strong ethical grounds for those organisations which seek to do well, to reassert affirmative action programmes in the global efforts to eradicate systemic discrimination and disadvantage.     

Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

This paper aims to shed light on the role of the ‘ideology’of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfarestate in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical findingson the determinants of social-programme entitlements and socialspending over the period 1981–99. The paper shows thatstructural change is a major determinant of the extent of socialprotection. Our results suggest that overall spending is drivenup by structural change. On the other hand, strong structuralchange has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measuredby the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence playsan important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-winggovernments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregatesocial expenditure, while right-wing governments undertake evenstronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structuralchange. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: bruno.amable{at}ens.fr; donatella.gatti{at}cepremap.cnrs.fr;jan.schumacher{at}wiwi.uni-regensburg.de