The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments

Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.     

The presence of unemployment hysteresis in the OECD: what can we learn from out-of-sample forecasts?

This paper investigates the relevance of unemployment hysteresis in seventeen OECD countries. We employ an out-of-sample forecast exercise in which a mean-reverting autoregressive model is compared to an autoregressive model with an imposed unit root. A substantial difference in forecasting performance between the two models is established for many countries, but the results are mixed in their strength. The evidence for unemployment hysteresis in Austria, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan and Sweden is, however, convincing. For no country can unambiguous support for a mean reverting unemployment rate be found.     

Earnings dynamics of men and women in Finland: permanent inequality versus earnings instability

I decompose the earnings variance of Finnish male and female workers into its permanent and transitory components using the approach of Baker (J Labor Econ,15:338–375, 1997) and Haider (J Labor Econ, 19:799–836, 2001) in the spirit of scientific replication. I find that the increasing earnings inequality of men and women is driven by both the transitory and permanent components of earnings. In addition, I find considerable differences in the earnings dynamics of men and women, that have been largely neglected in previous studies of earnings dynamics. The inequality among men is dominated by the permanent component. Conversely, permanent and transitory components are of comparable magnitudes to women. As a corollary, men experience more stable income paths but display larger permanent earnings differences. Women, on the other hand, face more unstable earnings profiles but show smaller permanent differences in earnings.     

Theory and Application of Directional Distance Functions

In 1957 Farrell demonstrated how cost inefficiency could be decomposed into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive components: technical and allocative inefficiency. This result is consequence of the fact that—as shown by Shephard—the cost function and the input distance function (the reciprocal of Farrell's technical efficiency measure) are dual to each other. Similarly, the revenue function and the output distance function are dual providing the basis for the decomposition of revenue inefficiency into technical and allocative components (see for example, Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994)). Here we extend those results to include the directional distance function and its dual, the profit function. This provides the basis for defining and decomposing profit efficiency. As we show, the output and input distance functions (reciprocals of Farrell efficiency measures) are special cases of the directional distance function. We also show how to use the directional distance function as a tool for measuring capacity utilization using DEA type techniques.     

Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?

We analyse the interaction between different labour market institutions in Germany, namely, industry‐level bargaining and firm‐level codetermination by works councils. In particular, we are interested in the moderating effect of flexibility measures on the link between the existence works councils and collective agreements on wages and productivity. In presence of institutional changes, the question is whether works councils in covered plants still generate rather than redistribute rents, given recent decentralisation processes in the German system of industrial relations. We augment a theoretical model to provide hypotheses, which are then tested using empirical analysis of representative German plant level data. We find that the existence of flexibility provisions in collective bargaining agreements does not alter the effect of works council on firms' wages. We find, however, that with flexibility provisions works council presence is associated with higher productivity levels than without such provisions. These findings, however, depend on the level of collective bargaining: they can only be observed in plants covered by industry‐level contracts, but do not hold in plants covered by firm‐level contracts.