A Formula for Success? Training,Reward and Commitment in a Chemicals Plant

Managerial strategies designed to elicit greater employee commitment in production have received much attention in recent industrial relations reseach. Training is seen to form a core component of such strategies, yielding such beneficial outcomes as improved efficiency and employee motivation. Yet the connections between training strategy and performance outcomes have been treated in an overly simplistic fashion. This in turn reflects a lack of empirical inquiry at the level of the shop-floor currently to be found in the subject area. By integrating an investigation of the workplace into the analysis of management strategy and performance outcomes, it is possible to develop a deeper understanding of the linkages between training provision, commitment and systems of reward.     

Rent-seeking and the tragedy of the commons: two approaches to problems of collective action in biology and economics

I am interested in how models, practices, and concepts travel across specialties and thereby change and are changed in turn. In the present essay I discuss Gordon Tullock’s ideas about the relationship between biology and economics in the light of his correspondence with the biologist Garrett Hardin. Tullock contributed to one of Hardin’s edited projects, but they took different approaches to related problems, which I characterize as problems of coordinated action. Tullock saw that he and Hardin were up to a similar line of inquiry, and Hardin engaged with him up to a point, but ultimately the biologist differed with the economist regarding the potential for the reliability of a regulating power such as the state.     

Take a risk: Preferring prevention over control of biological invaders

Scientists have argued that invasive species can be managed most cost effectively with greater investments in prevention. Further, under ideas like the precautionary principle it is reasonable to expect that a cautious manager would use more prevention relative to control because it keeps more invaders out. Yet, this is not typically done. In many cases, private and public resources are invested primarily to control existing invaders rather than to prevent new invasions. Managers frequently wait until after invaders have arrived and then scramble to limit the damages. We believe these paradoxical decisions can be understood by recognizing the link between typical human preferences for risk bearing and the technology of risk reduction. We demonstrate quantitatively how managers perceived to be cautious or averse to risk tend to shy away from prevention relative to control. This counterintuitive result arises because control is a safer choice than prevention because its productivity is relatively less risky: it works to remove existing invaders from the system. In contrast, the productivity of prevention is more uncertain because prevention only reduces the chance of invasion, it does not eliminate it, and invasion may not occur even in the absence of prevention. Managers' averse to risk will inherently avoid as much uncertainty as possible, whether the source of uncertainty regards ecological outcomes or economic productivity. Implications for environmental decision making are clear. In invasive species management, if managers act as though they are risk averse, their caution can backfire when it leads to more control rather than prevention. The social consequences of this choice are a greater probability of future invasions and lower social welfare. Our results suggest that social welfare is highest when managers were willing to “take a risk” with prevention.     

Advances in Drama Theory for Managing Global Hazards and Disasters. Part II: Coping with Global Climate Change and Environmental Catastrophe

We explore issues of group decision making for reducing global environmental risk, with particular reference to the political dynamics surrounding international agreements on tackling climate change. Continuing political delays in deciding to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may make it necessary to resort to high risk and controversial geo-engineering solutions, such as injecting large amounts of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere, despite the unforeseen, potentially catastrophic consequences that these entail. Advances in drama theory (dt.2) are used to analyze the prospects for agreement on reducing or stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions, following the Bali agreement of December 2007. It is concluded that Western nations and emerging economies are behaving like players in a game of “chicken”, each expecting the other to take on the main burden of emissions reduction. We judge it unlikely that either will play a full part until it is too late for emissions reduction alone to avert environmental catastrophe. At that point, parties will resort to geo-engineering “fixes”, despite the risks. However, all such forecasts are conditional on decisions made and attitudes taken by political leaders and the public. Our analysis serves to pinpoint the relevant decisions and attitudes.