Exploration-exploitation tradeoffs and information-knowledge gaps in self-regulated learning: Implications for learner-controlled training and development

Learning in modern organizations often involves managing a tradeoff between exploration (i.e., knowledge expansion) and exploitation (i.e., knowledge refinement). In this paper, we consider the implications of this tradeoff in the context of learner-controlled training and development. We then propose a model that integrates research on control theory, curiosity, and skill acquisition to explain how information knowledge gaps (i.e., gaps between what learners believe they know and what they desire to know) guide resource allocation decisions throughout the learning process. Using this model, we present testable propositions regarding (a) the different approaches learners take when resolving exploration-exploitation tradeoffs, (b) how systematic changes in learner perceptions translate into changes in systematic learner behavior, and (c) how common biases in key learner perceptions can undermine the functioning of self-regulated learning in training and development contexts. We finish with a discussion of the model's implications for the science and practice of training and development.     

WAGE VOLATILITY AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF LABOR SUPPLY

Over the past few decades, the skilled–unskilled hours differential for U.S. men increased when the skill premium rose sharply, in contrast with dominant income effects. Based on PSID data, we show that over the 1967–2000 period, skilled men experienced a three times larger increase in wage volatility than unskilled men. With the rise in wage volatility, our general equilibrium incomplete markets model generates a 2.7 hours increase in the hours differential whereas it increased by 1.4 hours in the data. We find that hours adjustments are important for self‐insurance in the short run, whereas precautionary savings play a crucial role eventually.     

Ordinaries

Journal of Bioeconomics - Neoclassical and behavioral economics disagree over the human consumption of dietary fat, a pervasive behavior that increases morbidity and mortality. Neoclassical...     

Customer Information Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.     

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.     

Does locational marginal pricing impact generation investment location decisions? An analysis of Texas’s wholesale electricity market

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Using data from Texas’s wholesale electricity market, we investigate the relationship between nodal prices and investment location decisions of utility-scale...     

Local underwriter oligopolies and IPO underpricing

We develop a theory of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing based on differentiated underwriting services and localized competition. Even though a large number of investment banks compete for IPOs, if issuers care about non-price dimensions of underwriting, then the industry structure is best characterized as a series of local oligopolies. We test our model implications on all-star analyst coverage, industry expertise, and other non-price dimensions. Furthermore, we posit that venture capitalists (VCs) are especially focused on all-star analyst coverage, and develop the analyst lust theory of the underpricing of VC-backed IPOs. Consistent with this theory, we find that VC-backed IPOs are much more underpriced when they have coverage from an all-star analyst.