RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

Does the one man show pay? Theory and evidence on the dual CEO revisited

Contrary to the view expressed in several countries and the corresponding pressure exerted by shareholder activists and regulators to separate the titles of CEO and Board Chairman, this study proposes that there is an optimal board composition for each firm, which varies across firms and over time. A review of the extant empirical evidence reveals that most prior studies bypass this notion which raises serious implications for related empirical studies. In addition, this study documents striking differences in leadership structures between the US and the UK and calls for further research in an international context.     

Customer Information Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications

We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history when firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings as complements or substitutes. We show that both the incentive to share customer information and its effects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another firm's customer lists. Our analysis also suggests a new role of middlemen as information aggregators.     

An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between Change in Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A Stakeholder Theory Perspective

Stakeholder theory provides a framework for investigating the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance. This relationship is investigated by examining how change in CSP is related to change in financial accounting measures. The findings provide some support for a tenet in stakeholder theory which asserts that the dominant stakeholder group, shareholders, financially benefit when management meets the demands of multiple stakeholders. Specifically, change in CSP was positively associated with growth in sales for the current and subsequent year. This indicates that there are short-term benefits from improving CSP. Return on sales was significantly positively related to change in CSP for the third financial period, indicating that long-term financial benefits may exist when CSP is improved.     

Self-managing selling teams and team performance: The complementary roles of empowerment and control

This work is the first to examine systematically the influence of empowerment and control on the degree to which selling teams engage in desired self-managing behaviors. Further, this work is the first to propose the construct of desired self-managing behaviors in a selling team context, and empirically examine its influence on selling team performance. Our investigation indicates that control of team self-management provides a complementary positive influence to that of empowerment on the degree to which selling teams exhibit desired self-managing behaviors. In addition, we find a positive relationship between the degree to which teams exhibit desired self-managing behaviors and selling team performance; moreover, this relationship explains, to a large degree, selling team performance. These findings are consistent with our thesis that control of teamwork facilitates performance on the selling team level, just as control of selling skills facilitates performance on the individual sales rep level.     

The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments

In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full cooperation does not necessarily implement these payoffs even when it maximizes total stage game payoffs. Rather, when the difference in players' discount factors is sufficiently large, Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are implemented by partial cooperation supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. When both players are sufficiently patient, such payoffs, while implemented via full cooperation, are supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. We characterize conditions under which public randomization has no impact on the Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs and conditions under which such payoffs are robust to renegotiation.     

The dynamics of exchange rate regimes: Fixes, floats, and flips

The impermanence of fixed exchange rates has become a stylized fact in international finance. The combination of the “mirage” view that pegs do not really peg with the “fear of floating” view that floats do not really float generates the conclusion that exchange rate regimes are, in practice, unimportant for the behavior of the exchange rate. This is consistent with evidence on the irrelevance of exchange rate regimes for general macroeconomic performance. Recent studies, however, show that the exchange rate regime matters. This can be understood by considering the dynamics of exchange rate regimes. We demonstrate that the “mirage” view is somewhat misleading and incomplete. Pegs frequently break, but many do last. Also, there is a high degree of flipping, that is, the re-formation of pegs that have broken. Thus, a fixed exchange rate today is a good predictor that one will exist in the future. We also investigate the quantitative effect of fixed exchange rates. While the “fear of floating” view suggests little actual difference in fixed and floating rates with respect to exchange rate volatility, we show that fixed exchange rates exhibit considerably greater bilateral exchange rate stability than flexible rates, both today and in the future.