Discounting and welfare evaluation of policies

We start with the premise that if policy discounting is to have any welfare relevance, one has to accept it being a derivative of a social welfare function (SWF). We show that if that derivative is to have a net present value (NPV) form, then the baseline allocation must be stationary. In addition, we show that at a stationary baseline in an overlapping generations growth economy, the intergenerationally fair discount rate equals the growth rate of per‐capita consumption, which is, roughly, 2% for the United States. This differs from the interest rate, even in the golden rule equilibrium, unless population growth is null. The last result is based on the main theorem in Mertens and Rubinchik (2012) and is demonstrated for a policy space that might naturally arise in applications.     

Will elders provide for their grandchildren? Unconditional cash transfers and educational expenditures in Bolivia

We take advantage of repeated cross‐sectional household surveys and a sharp discontinuity created by the introduction of an unconditional cash transfer to elders in Bolivia, to evaluate its impact on educational expenditures on children within a household. We find positive and significant impacts of the program at the aggregate level. We also find that the program has stronger effects on indigenous populations as well as on female and rural populations. Our results are robust to a series of falsification tests, survey structure, model specification, and estimation methods.     

Cue usage in financial statement fraud risk assessments: effects of technical knowledge and decision aid use

This paper investigates the effects of technical knowledge and decision aid use on financial statement fraud risk assessments made by directors and students. More extreme fraud risk assessments are made when participants identify and process larger (smaller) numbers of diagnostic (non‐diagnostic) factors, with technical knowledge driving diagnostic factor identification. Significant decision aid‐technical knowledge effects are also found; decision aid use has a detrimental effect on high‐knowledge directors while improving performance in inexperienced, low‐knowledge students. These results suggest that although decision aids can afford gains in performance in inexperienced users, they can have unintended and/or paradoxical behavioural effects on experienced users.     

Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets

We model platform competition in a market where products are characterized by cross network externalities. Consumers differ in their valuation of these externalities. Although the exogenous set-up is entirely symmetric, we show that platform competition induces a vertical differentiation structure that allows for the co-existence of asymmetric platforms in equilibrium. We establish this result in two set-ups: in the first one platforms commit to prices, in the second one they commit to network sizes.