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41.
    
This paper shows that, in the 2 × 3 sector‐specific capital Harris–Todaro model, capital growth owing to either domestic or foreign investment always enhances the welfare of the country (i.e. non‐immiserizing), and this result of non‐immiserizing foreign investment holds regardless of initial holdings of foreign capital; the policy of industrial targeting via capital investment is more effective vis‐à‐vis the (neoclassical) 2 × 2 mobile‐capital Harris–Todaro model or the Heckscher–Ohlin model; in contrast to the recent generalization by Marjit and Beladi (2003 ), capital growth cannot be immiserizing in the present model, even if it destroys the “envelope theorem.”  相似文献   
42.
    
In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.  相似文献   
43.
We start with the premise that if policy discounting is to have any welfare relevance, one has to accept it being a derivative of a social welfare function (SWF). We show that if that derivative is to have a net present value (NPV) form, then the baseline allocation must be stationary. In addition, we show that at a stationary baseline in an overlapping generations growth economy, the intergenerationally fair discount rate equals the growth rate of per‐capita consumption, which is, roughly, 2% for the United States. This differs from the interest rate, even in the golden rule equilibrium, unless population growth is null. The last result is based on the main theorem in Mertens and Rubinchik (2012) and is demonstrated for a policy space that might naturally arise in applications.  相似文献   
44.
    
Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging.  相似文献   
45.
46.
    
MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -  相似文献   
47.
    
This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.  相似文献   
48.
    
In this note Geoff Harcourt offers his views, via a face to face interview, on a wide range of issues relating to the discipline of economics. He recalls his time as a student at University of Melbourne, his choice of doctoral study and experiences at University of Cambridge, his original intellectual influences and affiliation, and his contributions to economics. He also discusses how economics have evolved over the years, comments on the current status of economic teaching, research and policy advice in Australia, and makes some recommendations to early career researchers. The note also includes a brief bio sketch of Professor Harcourt.  相似文献   
49.
This paper investigates the effects of technical knowledge and decision aid use on financial statement fraud risk assessments made by directors and students. More extreme fraud risk assessments are made when participants identify and process larger (smaller) numbers of diagnostic (non‐diagnostic) factors, with technical knowledge driving diagnostic factor identification. Significant decision aid‐technical knowledge effects are also found; decision aid use has a detrimental effect on high‐knowledge directors while improving performance in inexperienced, low‐knowledge students. These results suggest that although decision aids can afford gains in performance in inexperienced users, they can have unintended and/or paradoxical behavioural effects on experienced users.  相似文献   
50.
Vertical product differentiation and two-sided markets   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We model platform competition in a market where products are characterized by cross network externalities. Consumers differ in their valuation of these externalities. Although the exogenous set-up is entirely symmetric, we show that platform competition induces a vertical differentiation structure that allows for the co-existence of asymmetric platforms in equilibrium. We establish this result in two set-ups: in the first one platforms commit to prices, in the second one they commit to network sizes.  相似文献   
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