The ideology of class and tourism confronting the discourse of advertising

Starting from Baudrillard's analysis of the ideological character inherent in all consumption, touristic consumption, for many reasons ,has a special place in this social semantic. Here, advertising plays an important if not essential role because tourism is a product consumed outside of normal time and daily social space. Therefore the social semantic asserts itselfless through the product itself than through its representation: the discourse of advertising. But advertising discourse is plural, each form having its own ideology, competing with others. Behind the commercial competition lies a competition of social classes, but with a new typology, no longer based on the capital/favor relationship. Four ideological models are analyzed and illustrated with their advertising messages: the traditional model, the clerical/executive model, the youth model, and the “intellectual class” model.     

Real Existing Regionalism: The Region between Talk,Territory and Technology

In this essay, we propose the notion of real existing ‘lived’ regionalism as a rejoinder to the normative and ideological debates around new regionalism. Regional forms have shown little convergence in this age of globalized regionalization. Instead of an ideational construct or set of predictable practices, we argue that regionalism is a contested product of discourses (talk), territorial relationships (territory) and technologies (material and of power). The concept of real existing regionalism confronts the tensions between the discursive constructions and normative interventions characterizing much current regionalist debate and the territorial politics and technologies reflecting, generating and directing new state spatial strategic choices. The essay demonstrates the utility of the real existing regionalism framework through an analysis of the greenbelt, transport planning and post‐ suburbanization in Southern Ontario. We argue that regulatory institutions capture the Toronto region in a mix of rhetorical and technological change that complies with neither preconceived notions of regionalization nor the pessimism of total regional dysfunctionality. Rather, the lived experience of regionalization illuminates the emergent assemblages, multiplicity of everyday flows and ongoing multiscalar negotiations of diverse communities that produce the real existing region.     

Tradable water saving certificates to improve urban water use efficiency: an ex‐ante evaluation in a French case study

This paper proposes a system of tradable Water Saving Certificates to improve the efficiency of water allocation between Drinking Water Utilities at river basin level. A market institutional set‐up, inspired from recent policy developments in the energy sector, is proposed. An original analytical price‐endogenous model is developed to simulate trade intensity, equilibrium price and efficiency gains in this urban water market. The economic model is implemented in a French case study using mathematical programming. It is used for conducting an ex‐ante evaluation of trade possibilities and efficiency gains, considering different spatial restrictions aimed at controlling environmental externalities. Our modelling exercise provides evidence of the benefits of the proposed Water Saving Certificate scheme.     

The Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to Large Banks’ Capital

We propose a simple approach to quantifying the macroeconomic effects of shocks to large banks’ leverage. We first estimate a standard dynamic model of leverage targeting at the bank level and use it to derive an aggregate measure of the economic capital buffer of large US bank holding corporations. We then evaluate the response of key macro variables to a shock to this aggregate bank capital buffer using standard monetary VAR models. We find that shocks to the capital of large US banks explain a substantial share of the variance of credit to firms and real activity.     

A Tutorial on Palm Distributions for Spatial Point Processes

This tutorial provides an introduction to Palm distributions for spatial point processes. Initially, in the context of finite point processes, we give an explicit definition of Palm distributions in terms of their density functions. Then we review Palm distributions in the general case. Finally, we discuss some examples of Palm distributions for specific models and some applications.     

In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area

This paper applies the DSGE‐VAR methodology to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in the data and the relative contributions of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks, namely hand‐to‐mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Econometric experiments show that a DSGE model with Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy as it yields dynamic responses close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE‐VAR model (i.e. an impact output multiplier larger than one and a crowding‐in of private consumption). The estimated share of hand‐to‐mouth consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A New Strategy Against Hostile Takeovers: A Model of Defense in Participations

This article examines the efficacy of a ‘defense in participations’ policy consisting of competitors acquiring cross‐equity participations within the same industry to prevent hostile takeovers. This defense in participations strategy provides disincentive for raiders as partial ownerships increase market power of competitors and then reinforce the ‘outsider effect’. Also, we find conditions for a general result, which state that takeovers are less profitable in an industry with participations rather than in an industry without any capital links. We provide information to regulators about the positive social impact of cross participations in the context of mergers and expose an economic dilemma between a ‘laissez‐faire’ and an interventionist approach. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets

Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity, or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase. Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist. Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26. Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy     

Opportunistic tendencies in IJVS with the Japanese: The effects of culture,shared decision making,and relationship age

This study investigated how partners' self-reported opportunism and shared decision making varied by culture in international joint ventures (IJVs) with the Japanese. Data were gathered by a mail survey of senior officials in IJVs located in 11 host countries. Significant differences were found between partners from Western cultures and the Japanese, but not between other Asians and the Japanese. Indirect effects suggest that shared decision making neutralizes cultural tendencies toward opportunism. Results indicated that opportunistic tendencies did not diminish as the IJV relationship aged, and that shared decision making did diminish as the relationship aged.     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996