REINVENTING A CORPORATION: THE "SATELLITE" STRUCTURE OF THERMO ELECTRON

Thermo Electron has created a unique–and highly productive—corporate structure by selling to the public minority equity interests in 19 of its business units over the period 1983 to 1996. Since 1983, the company has achieved extraordinary gains for stockholders, both those of the parent company and those of most of its publicly traded subsidiaries.
The company's "satellite" structure is intended to preserve the benefits enjoyed by small entrepreneurial organizations without sacrificing many of the advantages enjoyed by larger firms. Although decentralization is a key element of the organizational design, another important feature of the Thermo Electron approach is that administrative activities unrelated to the focus of the unit's operations continue to be managed at the parent level. The combination of an entrepreneurial atmosphere with the financial and administrative support of a larger organization is used extensively by the company to attract and retain management and technical talent. In fact, the company made the remarkable claim in a 1995 Forbes article that "no developer or entrepreneur has ever left Thermo Electron."
Another major contributor to the company's entrepreneurial culture is an incentive structure that is tied directly to the equity performance of both the public units and the parent. Managers of the publicly traded units are granted significant amounts of stock options, but only 40% of those options are based on the performance of their subsidiary. Of the remaining 60%, 40% are granted in the stock of the parent and the other 20% are in stock of the other subsidiaries.     

INCOMPLETE DEMAND SYSTEMS AND SEMILOGARITHMIC DEMAND MODELS

The methodology of LaFrance and Hanemann for analysing the structure of incomplete demand systems is applied to models that are linear or logarithmic in quantities, prices and/or income. The structure of each model is presented when the implications of consumer choice theory are satisfied. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated. It is shown that considerable prior information is obtained from the theory of consumer choice when it is applied to this set of functional forms for demand equations.     

Responsibility accounting and asymmetry of information

This paper uses the principal-agent model to show that a manager's optimal compensation should generally include non-controllable factors of production such as the firm's investment in capital. This implies that the managerial accounting distinction between profit and investment centres is artificial. Examples are shown in which the ROI or RI criteria could be optimal for compensating managers implying that the optimal compensation criterion is very much specific to the firm's production and risk parameters. Thus, the debate about which criterion is more appropriate is vacuous.     

The Effects of Norms on Investor Reactions to Derivative Use

Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.     

Did Muhammad Ali foster industrialization in early nineteenth‐century Egypt?

Muhammad Ali, who ruled Egypt between 1805 and 1849, intervened in Egyptian markets in an attempt to foster industrialization, especially between 1812 and 1840. Like a modern marketing board, the state purchased agricultural commodities (cotton and wheat) at low prices and sold them on world markets at much higher prices, a policy equivalent to an export tax. Ali also replaced tax farming with his own land taxes. The revenues so derived were used in part to finance manufacturing investment and to build irrigation canals. In addition, Ali supplied flax and cotton at those cheap purchase prices to domestic textile manufacturing, thus subsidizing the industry. He also used non‐tariff barriers to exclude foreign competition from domestic markets. Were Ali's state‐led policies successful in fostering industry? The answer is no easier to extract from this phase of Egyptian history than from that of other poor countries at that time. This is because Egypt faced the same terms of trade boom typical of most poor commodity exporters, which was causing de‐industrialization everywhere else in the poor periphery. Ali picked a very difficult time to pursue his agenda, but we show that his policies were successful.     

Ordering,revenue and anchoring in art auctions

We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by Sotheby's and Christie's. We exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. When the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house, we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21% higher relative to the mean sale premium, and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is around 11% higher. We provide evidence that this is due to an anchoring effect.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Micromultinationals: Some Preliminary Evidence on an Emergent ‘Star’ of the International Entrepreneurship Field

This paper provides some preliminary evidence on the behaviour of the micromultinational, an emergent player in the international entrepreneurship field. Using survey data from the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, it found that mMNEs originate from a mixture of high and low technology sectors and employ Foreign Direct Investment as well as international contractual approaches in servicing their foreign target markets. It also concluded that micromultinationals overseas market selection decisions were mainly influenced by market- and knowledge-seeking factors rather than considerations of psychic proximity. The implications of these summary findings for policy, theory and future research are discussed in the paper.