The Role of Speculation and Information in the Early Evolution of the United States Ostrich Industry: An Industry Case Study

The U.S. ostrich industry was introduced in the 1980s and experienced rapid expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Breeding stock prices rose rapidly and subsequently plummeted during 1993–1995. High prices are to be expected in the introductory stage of an industry. However, the magnitude of prices in the ostrich industry is likely due to overestimates of ostrich productivity and future demand for ostrich products, as well as speculation in the ostrich market. This paper discusses the evolution of the industry from the mid-1980s to the present.     

Exploring New Product Development Project Review Practices*

Most organizations use new product development (NPD) processes that consist of activities and review points. Activities basically solve problems and gather and produce information about the viability of successfully completing the project. Interspersed between the development activities are review points where project information is reviewed and a decision is made to either go on to the next stage of the process, stop it prior to completion, or hold it until more information is gathered and a better decision can be made. The review points are for controlling risk, prioritizing projects, and allocating resources, and the review team typically is cross‐disciplinary, comprising senior managers from marketing, finance, research and development (R&D), or manufacturing. Over the past four decades, research has greatly advanced knowledge with respect to NPD activities; however, much less is known about review practices. For this reason, the present paper reports findings of a study on NPD project review practices from 425 Product Development & Management Association (PDMA) members. The focus is on three decision points in the NPD process common across organizations (i.e., initial screen, prior to development and testing, and prior to commercialization). In this paper, the number of (1) review points used, (2) review criteria, (3) decision makers on review committees and the proficiency with which various evaluation criteria are used are compared across incremental and radical projects and across functional areas (i.e., marketing, technical, financial). Furthermore, the associations between these NPD review practices and new product performance are examined. Selected results show that more review points are used for radical NPD projects than incremental ones, and this is related to a relatively lower rate of survival for radical projects. The findings also show that the number of criteria used to evaluate NPD projects increases as NPD projects progress and that the number of review team members grows over the stages, too. Surprisingly, the results reveal that more criteria are used to evaluate incremental NPD projects than radical ones. As expected, managers appear to more proficiently use evaluation criteria when making project continuation/termination decisions for incremental projects; they use these criteria less proficiently during the development of radical projects, precisely when proficiency is most critical. At each review point, technical criteria were found to be the most frequently used type for incremental projects, and financial criteria were the most commonly used type for radical ones. Importantly, only review proficiency is significantly associated with performance; the number of review points, review team size, and number of review criteria are not associated with new product performance. Furthermore, only the coefficient for proficiently using marketing criteria was significantly related to new product program performance; the proficiency of using financial and technical information has no association with performance. Finally, across the three focal review points of the NPD process in this study, only the coefficient for proficiency at the first review point, (i.e., the initial screen) is significantly greater than zero. The results are discussed with respect to research and managerial practice, and future research directions are offered.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.     

The emerging value network in the mobile phone industry: The case of Japan and its implications for the rest of the world

This paper considers how the mobile phone industry is changing from a value chain to a value network using the Japanese market as an example. Value networks involve a larger number of firms, a more complex set of relationships between them, and agreements on a greater number of interface standards than do value chains. Building from this concept of a value network, the paper shows how: (1) agreements on many of these interface standards are enabling connections to be made between the mobile phone and other industries; (2) the resulting products and services often reflect the technological capability of phones and the existing products and services in these “other” industries; (3) each new interface standard requires a new critical mass of users; and (4) a critical mass of users for a new interface standard partly builds from previously created critical masses of users. On a practical level, this paper's analysis adds to a growing list of evidence that the growth in Western mobile Internet markets is nowhere near its potential and that the change from a value chain to a value network requires a different form of standard setting, policy making, and management than are currently used in the mobile phone industry.     

Technology choice under changing peanut policies

The effect of marketing quotas and price supports on technology adoption are examined for peanut production in the southeastern United States using a real options model of investment with output price and yield uncertainty. The optimal choice of peanut production technology (dryland versus irrigated) in the southeast is shown to depend on price supports and how they change. The manner in which price supports change will have an effect on the choice and rates of abandonment or adoption of production technologies.     

Regulatory Uncertainty and Financial Contagion: Evidence from the Hybrid Capital Securities Market

This paper examines the negative market impact that resulted from the insurance regulators’ potential reclassification of 140 hybrid capital securities in spring and summer 2006. It illustrates how financial contagion can spring from a regulatory policy change that lacks transparency. We investigate the impact of the uncertainty surrounding the regulators’ true classification criteria by measuring the effect of the reclassification announcements on hybrid new issue volume, cumulative average abnormal returns, bid‐ask spreads, and yield spreads. The financial contagion adversely affected the entire hybrid capital securities market for six months. The effect was most pronounced among those hybrids that were eventually reclassified as common equity equivalents. It was greater for Yankee Tier 1 hybrids, which had been more popular with insurance firm investors prior to the reclassifications, than among non‐Tier 1 hybrids.     

Corporate payout policy in Australia and a test of the life‐cycle theory

We provide evidence on the frequency and size of payouts by Australian firms, and test whether the life‐cycle theory explains Australian corporate payout policies. Regular dividends remain the most popular mechanism for distributing cash to shareholders, despite a slight decline in the proportion of dividend payers since the relaxation of buyback regulations in 1998. Off‐market share buybacks return the largest amount of cash to shareholders. Dividend paying firms are larger, more profitable and have less growth options that nondividend paying firms. Consistent with the life‐cycle theory, we observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay regular dividends and the proportion of shareholders’ equity that is earned rather than contributed.