Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Inventory accuracy in 60 days!

Despite great advances in manufacturing technology and management science, thousands of organizations still don't have a handle on basic inventory accuracy. Many companies don't even measure it properly, or at all, and lack corrective action programs to improve it. This article offers an approach that has proven successful a number of times, when companies were quite serious about making improvements. Not only can it be implemented, but also it can likely be implemented within 60 days per area, if properly managed. The hardest part is selling people on the need to improve and then keeping them motivated. The net cost of such a program? Probably less than nothing, since the benefits gained usually far exceed the costs. Improved inventory accuracy can aid in enhancing customer service, determining purchasing and manufacturing priorities, reducing operating costs, and increasing the accuracy of financial records. This article also addresses the gap in contemporary literature regarding accuracy program features for repetitive, JIT, cellular, and process- and project-oriented environments.     

Controlling for the Impact of Variable Liquidity in Commercial Real Estate Price Indices

Liquidity in private asset markets is notoriously variable over time. Therefore, indices of changes in market value that are based on asset transaction prices will systematically reflect intertemporal differences in the ease of selling a property. We define and develop a concept of "constant-liquidity value" in the context of a model that is characterized by pro-cyclical volume of trading. We then present an econometric model that allows for estimation of both a standard transaction-based price index and a constant-liquidity index. Our application to the NCREIF database reveals that, in the case of institutional commercial real estate investment, constant-liquidity values tend to lead transaction-based and appraisal-based indices in time, and also to display greater volatility and cycle amplitude. The differences can be significant for strategic investment policy viewed from a mean-variance portfolio optimization perspective.     

Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory Annuitization With Mortality Heterogeneity

This article examines the distributional implications of mandatory longevity insurance when mortality heterogeneity exists in the population. Previous research has demonstrated the significant financial redistribution that occurs under alternative annuity programs in the presence of differential mortality across groups. This article embeds that analysis into a life‐cycle framework that allows for an examination of distributional effects on a utility‐adjusted basis. It finds that the degree of redistribution that occurs from the introduction of a mandatory annuity program is substantially lower on a utility‐adjusted basis than when evaluated on a purely financial basis. In a simple life‐cycle model with no bequests, complete annuitization is welfare enhancing even for those with higher‐than‐average expected mortality rates, so long as administrative costs are sufficiently low. These findings have implications for policy toward annuitization, particularly as part of a reformed Social Security system.     

Debt in industry equilibrium

This article shows (1) how entry and exit of firms in a competitiveindustry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capitalstructure, and (2) how, given a trade-off between tax advantagesand agency costs, a firm will optimally adjust its leveragelevel after it is set up. We derive simple pricing expressionsfor corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand forindustry output plays a crucial role. When a firm optimallyadjusts its leverage over time, we show that total firm valuecomprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixedcapital structure, plus a continuum of options for marginalincreases in debt.     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technological diversity,related diversification,and firm performance

Previous findings that related diversification creates value have been called into question over concerns about methodology and measures. Reviewing existing theory to consider how a firm's knowledge base interacts with its product market activity, I address several of these concerns by creating a measure of technological diversity based on citation‐weighted patents. The measure indicates a firm's opportunity for corporate diversification based on economies of scope in valuable knowledge assets, is defined for both single‐ and multibusiness firms, and is not correlated with more fundamental aspects of diversification, such as the number of businesses in the corporate portfolio. Evidence from a large sample of firms shows the positive relationship between diversification based on technological diversity and market‐based measures of performance, controlling for R&D intensity and capital intensity as further indicators of the type of assets underlying diversification. Results hold when controlling for the endogeneity of diversification and performance in a cross‐sectional sample or when controlling for unobserved factors using panel data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.