Inflation Uncertainty and Strike Activity

In this paper, we hypothesize that the general level of uncertainty can influence the level of strike activity. We test this hypothesis by considering the impact of inflation uncertain & on strike activity. Two databases are used: a pooled time-series cross-section sample of individual negotiations over the period 1971–1980, and quarterly data on negotiations from 1954 to 1980. Results from both data sets support the proposition that inflation uncertainty influences strike activity.     

Corporate strategy and capital structure

The basic thesis of this exploratory investigation was that a corporate strategy perspective may complement the traditional financial paradigm in explaining capital structure in large U.S. corporations. Earlier fusion of strategic and financial literature led to a series of propositions antecedent to this work. Inclusion of Rumelt's diversification categories plus elsewhere validated financial contextual variables led to hypotheses for the present study. Results suggest a managerial choice perspective may help to explain the capital structure choice at the firm level of analysis.     

Cable television and competition : Theory, evidence and policy

There is currently widespread discussion in the USA of the merits of amending legislation to allow competition in the cable television market, notably from the telecommunications companies. This article explores what economic theory can contribute to this debate, and adduces empirical evidence on the effects of competition in the cable market where it presently exists. The authors conclude that blocking entry into cable, and indeed into telecommunications markets, is likely to be poor policy, and that increased competition would foster the development of an efficient modern broadband network.     

The value of the voting right: a study of the Milan Stock Exchange experience

I study the large premium (82 percent) attributed to votingshares on the Milan Stock Exchange. The premium varies accordingto the ownership structure and the concentration of the votingrights, and it can be rationalized in the presence of enormousprivate benefit of control A case study seems to indicate thatin Italy private benefits of control can easily be worth morethan 60 percent of the value of nonvoting equity. A tentativeexplanation for these findings is provided.