Towards a typology of transparency for marketing management research

This paper explores and extends the concept of transparency, as transparency-related terminology in marketing management research is limited in its typological development. Building on previous research, it outlines four types of transparency and extends them by adding three related facets. The four types are: cost transparency, supply transparency, organizational transparency and technological transparency. The expanded concept of transparency is discussed and analyzed using four illustrations, based on case studies conducted at two focal firms in the Swedish manufacturing industry. The study contributes to the field of marketing management research by showing the interrelatedness of information technology exploitation, trust and transparency. In addition, the study highlights the dynamic aspects of the transparency concept. In contrast to results of former studies, the present findings indicate that increased transparency in buyer-supplier relationships brings about not only positive, but also some negative effects.     

True and Fair View Revisited – A Reply to Alexander and Nobes

This paper is a response to the critical comments of Alexander (2006) and Nobes (2006) on our article on revenue recognition, which was published last year in this journal (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005). While Alexander primarily objects to our statement that there is a ‘requirement of legal certainty in the European Union’, Nobes challenges our interpretation of the true and fair view principle and its role in the endorsement and application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the EU. We rebut Alexander's objections by providing references, which evidence that the principle of legal certainty represents a fundamental concept of Community law. We refute Nobes' counterarguments by inferring from the objective of the IAS Regulation and the purpose of the endorsement mechanism that a common meaning of the true and fair view principle must exist in the EU, that IFRS should only become applicable in the EU if they are not contrary to this ‘European’ true and fair view principle and that the true and fair view principle should also be considered in the application of IFRS in the EU, particularly in the choice of accounting policies for unregulated issues.     

What Determines Collection Rates of Debt Collection Agencies?

We contribute to the literature on debt collection agencies in two ways: First, we present an estimation of the collection rates. The distribution of collection rates exhibits a mean of about 65% and a strong bimodality with peaks at the very ends of the distribution. Second, we investigate potential determinants of the collection success. We find that collection rates are positively related to the exposure at default and to prior debtor‐specific collection rates. In contrast, the age of the account and—if applicable—prior experience with the debtor have a negative impact on collection rates.     

Corporate bond liquidity before and after the onset of the subprime crisis

We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads during 2005-2009 using a new robust illiquidity measure. The spread contribution from illiquidity increases dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. The increase is slow and persistent for investment grade bonds while the effect is stronger but more short-lived for speculative grade bonds. Bonds become less liquid when financial distress hits a lead underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by financial firms dries up under crises. During the subprime crisis, flight-to-quality is confined to AAA-rated bonds.     

Failures to enact the future—A social practice perspective

To be successful, organisational foresight requires a multitude of perspectives and faculties. We have adopted a social practice perspective, which we base within an interpretative world view, to better understand how organisational foresight is enacted. This offers a reading of the phenomena, of which the essential contribution is that organisational foresight is more than an organisational property; it is something that reflective people do as they engage with various inputs from the outside and as a result of the continuous interaction between activity systems and their constituting elements. A longitudinal case study illustrates the importance of understanding the construction of collective and individual meaning in working with organisational foresight. The study shows how the inherent rigidity of the existing activity system and the weak ties between these diverse subsets of the organisation may block the interaction between emerging social practices and organisational intentions resulting in ongoing failures of understanding and enactment. A model is developed to include these parameters in an augmented activity systems model. Based on this we have identified the linking of organisational levels as one of the key dimensions to be considered for which the social practice perspective holds significant explanatory strength.     

Why do firms train apprentices? The net cost puzzle reconsidered

This paper analyses the impact of increasing the share of apprentices at the cost of the share of unskilled or semi-skilled employees on establishment performance. We use representative matched employer–employee panel data and correct for estimation biases. We show that an increase of the apprentice share in trade, commercial, craft or construction occupations has a positive impact on establishment performance. Establishments that increase the apprentice share in manufacturing occupations face a negative impact on performance, however. These results shed a new light on the stylised fact that apprenticeship training always leads to net costs during the apprenticeship period in Germany: we argue that establishments only hire apprentices at a cost if their skills are relatively specific, their retention rate is high and skilled employees are hard to hire.     

Rational Inefficiencies

In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.