The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency

One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output.     

Effects of Works Councils on Firm‐Provided Further Training in Germany

Unions are an important indicator of various measures of firm performance in Anglo‐Saxon countries. The same is true for the German analogue of the workplace union, the works council. Using German establishment data, I examine the impact of works councils on further training. I employ pooled logit and count‐data models to analyse the further training activity and intensity of German firms. Because the treatment variable may suffer from endogeneity, I also adopt linear and nonlinear instrumental variable techniques. The analysis reveals a positive impact of works councils on firm‐provided training and provides slightly weaker evidence for firm‐size differentials in workplace representation. I conclude that enhanced management–employee relations foster the training efforts of firms.     

Interpenetration Versus Embeddedness

A bstract .   The economy and economics are important fields in Talcott Parsons's work. Parsons's contributions on this subject were, however, mostly critically received in the new economic sociology. In this article, main points of criticism of Parsons's economic sociology will be discussed and the question asked whether the importance of Parsons's works in economic sociology was adequately treated. It will be demonstrated that the critical assessments was based for the most part on theoretical conceptions Parsons developed during his structural-functionalist period. Hence the assessments neglected to discuss the theory of expressive-symbolic communication of affect that Parsons developed in his later systems-functionalist period. However, precisely these later theoretical developments correlate directly with the concept of social embeddedness as a key concept in the new economic sociology. A stronger linking with this development in Parsons's theory could bring economic sociology closer to finding a foundation in action theory, which has been missing up to the present.     

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES: IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION

The value of household production is estimated to 40–50 percent of GNP in most western countries, and because the distribution of this income-in-kind is different from ordinary income distribution, the concept of economic well-being may include household production. The monetary value of household production is evaluated by a market alternative principle and an opportunity-cost principle. In the last case a reservation wage is estimated, and integrated in a modified opportunity principle, which means that household work of non-working women is evaluated by the reservation wage, and household work of working women and men by their wage-rate. The conclusions are among others, that the inclusion of household production reduces the inequality, and that the women's contributions—money income and household production—functions as income equalizers.