Control and co-ordination of Japanese subsidiaries in China: problems of an expatriate-based management system

This paper analyses the international management control (IMC) system that Japanese multinational companies (MNCs) employ to co-ordinate the activities of their subsidiaries in China. It focuses on the role of Japanese expatriates in this IMC system and assesses their performance. In the process, it offers a comprehensive evaluation of the organizational fit of the Japanese IMC model within the current Chinese business environment. Taking Japanese firms as the subject, the analysis identifies areas of incongruity and explains the underlying reasons for problems with expatriate-focused IMC models. In doing so, this paper argues that the Japanese expatriate-based control system in China (as in many other parts of the world) continues to be characterized by an insider-outsider mentality that prevents a real internationalization of overseas operations in the 'transnational' sense.     

TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING POLICY CHOICE: REPLY

Taylor (1992) argues that accounting policy choices in any year are not assessed independently of policy choices adopted in previous years. This independence assumption is a maintained hypothesis of Anderson and Zimmer (1992). Although Taylor acknowledges that our results remain robust to his suggested adjustments for non-independence, we argue in this reply that such adjustments are unnecessary because temporal independence of accounting policy choices is consistent with the implications of costly contracting between the firm and its claimholders. We develop the arguments that (1) accounting choices are temporally independent and our research design is therefore, appropriate (2) to the extent that there is an independence problem of the type proposed by Taylor (1992) it also applies to cross-sectional studies of accounting policy choice.     

The Impact of Surplus Distribution on the Risk Exposure of With Profit Life Insurance Policies Including Interest Rate Guarantees

This article analyzes the numerical impact of different surplus distribution mechanisms on the risk exposure of a life insurance company selling with profit life insurance policies with a cliquet‐style interest rate guarantee. Three representative companies are considered, each using a different type of surplus distribution: a mechanism, where the guaranteed interest rate also applies to surplus that has been credited in the past, a slightly less restrictive type in which a guaranteed rate of interest of 0 percent applies to past surplus, and a third mechanism that allows for the company to use former surplus in order to compensate for underperformance in “bad” years. Although at the outset all contracts offer the same guaranteed benefit at maturity, a distribution mechanism of the third type yields preferable results with respect to the considered risk measure. In particular, throughout the analysis, our representative company 3 faces ceteris paribus a significantly lower shortfall risk than the other two companies. Offering “strong” guarantees puts companies at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to insurers providing only the third type of surplus distribution mechanism.     

Auditor Reputation Under Different Negligence Regimes

Do auditor reputation effects evolve the same way under precise negligence as under vague negligence? Or are there differences? We assume that investors update their beliefs on unobservable auditor quality when an auditor discloses an inaccurate report. We call this a reputation effect. A necessary condition for reputation effects to occur is that, ex ante, investors expect ‘good’ auditors to take more care than ‘bad’ auditors such that ‘good’ auditors are less likely to issue an inaccurate report. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that wealthier (‘good’) auditors tend to take more care than less wealthy (‘bad’) auditors. We find that under vague negligence, reputation effects will occur, inducing both types of auditor to increase the level of care taken. A ‘good’ auditor is likely to exert excessive care. Then, even in the absence of auditor risk aversion, a (properly defined) liability cap is necessary to induce efficient incentives. A contractual liability cap is preferable to a legally fixed liability cap. Under precise negligence, a ‘good’ auditor will exert the standard of due care. However, a ‘bad’ auditor will also do so if sufficiently wealthy. Consequently, ex ante, investors do not expect different levels of care to be taken or reputation effects to occur. A liability cap is not desirable. This paper highlights the importance of non‐legal sanctions in auditor liability. Finally, it links the ‘reputation’ and ‘deep pocket’ hypotheses, both of which have attempted separately in the past to explain the positive correlation between auditor size and auditor quality.     

Siemens: Maßhalten beim Moralisieren

Ohne Zusammenfassung Prof. Dr. Jochen Zimmermann ist Professor für Betriebswirtschaftslehre an der Universit?t Bremen     

Forschung und Innovation: Wo steht Deutschland?

Aufwendungen für Forschung und Entwicklung werden im Hinblick auf die internationale Wettbewerbsf?higkeit eines Wirtschafts- und Technologiestandorts als besonders bedeutsam eingesch?tzt. Wie l?sst sich der Zusammenhang zwischen Forschung und wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung empirisch nachweisen? Welchen Rang nimmt Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich der Forschungs- und Innovationsaktivit?ten ein? Welche Handlungsoptionen ergeben sich für die Wirtschaftspolitik?