The missing link: Bringing institutions and politics into energy future studies

Energy future studies can be a useful tool for learning about how to induce and manage technical, economic and policy change related to energy supply and use. The private sector has successfully deployed them for strategic planning, examining key parameters such as markets, competition and consumer trends. However in public policy, most energy future studies remain disconnected from policy making. One reason is that they often ignore the key political and institutional factors that underpin much of the anticipated, wished-for or otherwise explored energy systems developments. Still, we know that institutions and politics are critical enablers or constraints to technical and policy change. This paper examines how analytical insights into political and institutional dynamics can enhance energy future studies. It develops an approach that combines systems-technical change scenarios with political and institutional analysis. Using the example of a backcasting study dealing with the long term low-carbon transformation of a national energy system, it applies two levels of institutional and political analysis; at the level of international regimes and at the level of sectoral policy, and examines how future systems changes and policy paths are conditioned by institutional change processes. It finds that the systematic application of these variables significantly enhances and renders more useful backcasting studies of energy futures.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

Frontrunners and Laggards: The Strategy of Environmental Regulation under Uncertainty

The extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts. First, companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation. Second, ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates. Finally, regulators use limited information provided by the industry. I construct a game-theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator. In equilibrium, companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry. This profit-driven behavior is not always socially detrimental, however, as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost. Additionally, the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates: if companies condition compliance on the installation cost, only low-cost companies install in equilibrium. The analysis combines “regulatory capture” with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator.     

A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels

This paper extends the classic war of attrition to allow for a wide range of actions. Players alternate making arbitrary payments, and their opponent may either match this payment, or concede. We analyze both cases of complete and incomplete information. As opposed to the classic war of attrition, the equilibrium is unique, rent-dissipation is only partial, and weaker (lower valuation) players concede more quickly than stronger players.     

Mittelschicht zwischen Abstiegsängsten und hoher Belastung

Zeitgespr?ch

Mittelschicht zwischen Abstiegs?ngsten und hoher Belastung     

CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI-REGIONAL INPUT–OUTPUT TABLES USING THE CHARM METHOD

Subnational multi-regional input–output tables (IOT) are important tools for studying interregional socio-economic and/or environmental interrelations that help to address a wide range of current societal, ecological and economic challenges. However, the lack of subnational input–output data is a major obstacle which leads to a wide use of non-survey methods. Like other non-survey methods, the cross-hauling adjusted regionalization method (CHARM) was originally developed for the construction of single-regional IOT. In this paper, we extend CHARM to the case of bi- and multi-regional IOT. We find that the original CHARM formula has two limitations that are also of great importance for the single-regional case: First, cross-hauling in interregional trade is implicitly set to zero and, second, accounting balances may be violated owing to structural differences between the regional and national economies. We present a modified formula addressing these issues and examine its performance in terms of a case study.     

COLLATERAL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSET PRICES

Many assets derive their value not only from future cash flows but also from their ability to serve as collateral. In this article, we investigate this collateral premium and its impact on asset returns in an infinite‐horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We document that borrowing against collateral substantially increases the return volatility of long‐lived assets. Moreover, otherwise identical assets with different degrees of collateralizability exhibit substantially different return dynamics because their prices contain a sizable collateral premium that varies over time. This premium can be positive even for assets that never pay dividends.     

Human resource management in Asian subsidiaries: comparison of French and Japanese MNCs

European and Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) have expanded their activities in Asia, usually through massive mobilization of various human resources from head offices, whether expatriated or on short-term assignments, and a reliance on diverse categories of local employees. Because expatriation is costly, difficult and often limited in its results, MNCs have developed localization strategies for management positions to support their regional development. This contribution addresses such a scenario by comparing Japanese and French MNCs in eight Asian countries, based on 53 interviews across subsidiaries of 17 MNCs. We find that Japanese MNCs have not localized management positions as much as French MNCs, but they have grown more willing to do so. To compensate for the lack of local capabilities without sending more expatriates, both French and Japanese MNCs frequently send experts on short-term assignments. Finally, though human resource practices vary widely across countries, even for a given MNC, some harmonizing principles have been introduced to regional HRM strategies recently.     

Incentives for experimenting agents

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises—the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front‐load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an initial period, until switching to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates effort near the beginning, when most valuable, whereas the switch attenuates the dynamic agency cost.