Ethics,gratuities, and professionalization of the purchasing function

This study investigated (1) whether potential future purchasing agents were predisposed to accept gratuities or whether the practice of gratuity acceptance is a manifestation of the job itself, (2) whether the existence of a code of ethics forbidding gratuity acceptance curtails the occurrence, and (3) whether disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions affect gratuity acceptance. Hypotheses based upon the concepts of organizational concern and institutionalized ethics are developed and empirically tested. Results suggest that future purchasing agents are predisposed to accept gratuities and that formal written ethics policies decrease the acceptance of gratuities. Disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions concerning gratuities failed to affect gratuity acceptance significantly.Gregory B. Turner is assistant professor of marketing at Livingston University. He has published inThe International Journal of Logistics Management and theTransportation Journal.G. Stephen Taylor is Associate Professor of management at Mississippi State University. His research interests include ethics in computer usage, performance appraisal, and turnover control.Mark F. Hartley is Assistant Professor and National Association of Purchasing Management/Carolinas-Virginia chair of Purchasing at the College of Charleston. His research interests include ethics and professionalization of the purchasing function.     

Manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain

The marketing literature exhibits a consistent lack of concern to recognize the distinct differences among the various possible manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain. The practice of using terms pertaining to different manifestations of compulsiveness synonymously, especially when the meaning of the term “compulsive behavior” is itself under debate, creates further semantic uncertainties that hinder typological endeavors in the budding area of abnormal or deviant consumer behavior. This article attempts to remove such uncertainties by elucidating and establishing the differences among the above manifestations.     

SOME ESTIMATES OF TRADE FLOWS IN BANKING SERVICES

This paper presents some estimates of international trade in banking services. We use IMF data on assets and liabilities of both domestic banks and non-banks with foreign banks, and of foreigners with the domestic banking system to construct measures of the volume of transactions on which banking intermediation services are provided across national borders. We then use estimates of the spread between borrowing and lending rates for depositors and borrowers with the financial institutions involved to estimate the value of international flows of intermediation services. Estimates are presented for 1982–84 and 1991–93 for the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.     

Evidence on the motivation for management forecasts of corporate earnings

A multivariate model of the process by which managers decide to release public forecasts of their firms' earnings is developed, based on factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for and the willingness to supply such forecasts. We test the model on data from a comprehensive sample of earnings forecasts, and find support for our hypotheses about the likely joint influence of those factors. Larger firm size, greater leverage, higher and more stable earnings rates and less rapid growth rates are found to be associated with an increased propensity for management to provide earnings forecasts for their firms.     

Ecosystems,externalities, and economies

This paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy. The decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level. A species may provide utility directly to humans, or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species. We describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species' demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species, and energy is conserved. The ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy. Human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans. This framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans, which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems, and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained.     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.