MODELING THE TERM STRUCTURE FROM THE ON‐THE‐RUN TREASURY YIELD CURVE

We propose a new model to estimate the term structure of interest rates using observed on‐the‐run Treasury yields. The new model is an improvement over models that require a priori knowledge of the shape of the yield curve to estimate the term structure. The general form of the model is an exponential function that depends on the estimation of four parameters fit by nonlinear least squares and has straightforward interpretations. In comparing the proposed model with current yield‐curve‐smoothing models, we find that, for the data used, the proposed model does best overall in terms of pricing accuracy both in sample and out of sample. JEL classification: E43, G12     

Lord Aldington's Disservice to Wealth Creation

The habitual opposition to the growth of service industries from traditionalists and manufacturing interests is rehearsed in the Aldington Report on Overseas Trade John McEnery (right), former Under-Secretary at the Department of Trade and Industry, and author of IEA Research Monograph Manufacturing Two Nations, condemns outmoded patterns of thought and recalls on the Upper House to abandon its manufacturing myopia     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

Regulatory Control of the Track Access Charges of Railtrack plc

Railtrack plc, floated in 1996, was the private sector owner of Britain's railway track, signals and stations. Its major source of revenue came from track access charges, which individual train operating companies (TOCs) paid for use of the infrastructure. Since many of these TOCs received substantial subsidies to assist in paying their track access charges, Railtrack was in effect being heavily subsidised. In October 2001, the Government decided that these arrangements were no longer viable and placed Railtrack into administration. This article explains how the level of indirect subsidies to Railtrack had become excessive, and raises crucial questions that need to be addressed in settling the future shape of the railway industry.     

Contract compliance and equal opportunities

In 1983, the Greater London Council adopted a policy of 'Contract Compliance' designed to ensure that firms selling goods and services to the Council complied with its equal opportunity requirements. The initiative aroused wide interest and many other local authorities - 40 are known of to date - have been considering introducing such a policy. Although simple in essence, its execution can be complex and difficult. In April 1986, the Inner London Education Authority, a partner in the GLC policy, took over the Contract Compliance Unit following the GLCs abolition. Linda Smith explains the background to contract compliance, how the GLC, now ILEA, operates the policy; assesses its achievements and its significance and explores some of the lessons learnt in its three years of operation.     

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE EURO?

The Stability Pact ‐ intended to make EMU governments run prudent budgets ‐ is losing its credibility. This article asks the question: what will happen if national debts start to rise again and some governments then have difficulty borrowing? It suggests that there will be calls for bailout, that the EU's political structures will not cope well with the resulting arguments over which countries will pay, and that the eventual and painful result will be a return to the principle that currencies and political areas coincide.