Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.     

The implications of job matching for retirement health insurance and leave benefits

This paper focuses on potential reasons for variations in benefit packages, in particular variations in the availability of retirement health insurance and leave. An important feature of our analysis is that we do not start with heterogeneity in workforces to explain fringe benefit differences across employers. It would be straightforward to say that differences across employers in fringe benefit packages simply represent differences in the preferences of their workforces. Rather, we focus on heterogeneity across employers as an important source of differences in fringe benefit packages. Preliminary evidence is found supportive of the predicted differences in the likelihood of such fringe benefits as retirement health insurance and leave based upon two variables–the extent of on-the-job training offered by the employer and the size of the employers. We also examine the implied links between these fringe benefits and such variables as average tenture and the proportion of the workforce that is female.     

When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?

We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this “use value” and for its “foreclosure value,” because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare‐maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage. Bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare‐maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies.     

A comparative analysis of multiattribute attitude models

In the consumer behavior context, multiattribute attitude models used to predict consumer choice in multiple criteria decision making situations have produced mixed results. Prediction of consumer behavior from attitudes, consequently, has been highly debated in recent years with researchers using beliefs-only, full, and extended multiattribute attitude models. The research underlying this paper was designed to compare the predictive superiority of the beliefs-only model, the full multiattribute attitude model, and a new representation identified as the combined multiattribute/determinant attribute attitude model. Data concerning patronage of fast-food chains were collected from a student panel for seven weeks. Predictive superiority was determined by average adjusted R² using the patronage behavior dependent variable. All models were tested in aggregated and disaggregated form.     

Industrial reform in Jamaica in the 1980s: an export promotion strategy

Jamaica has shifted gradually from an import substitution strategy of industrialization in the 1960s and early 1970s to a much more export-orientated approach. Policy in the 1980s has been based around changes to the real exchange rate, foreign trade liberalization, fiscal incentives to new investment, particularly foreign investment, and selective support through various subsidies. Performance has been mixed, however, with only the garment sub-sector of manufacturing achieving significant export growth. Furthermore, the heavy involvement of transnational firms in the new industrial investment raises questions about the long-run viability of the form of export promotion currently being pursued     

Subsidizing (and taxing) business procurement

This paper studies the effect of a subsidy (or tax) on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers. Subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs. That is, overshifting occurs. When the size of the subsidy is not too large, the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy. A relatively weak sufficient condition for these results to hold is that suppliers earn a positive profit margin on the marginal unit sold, before taking into account any subsidy payment. Stronger sufficient conditions, tailored to each result, are provided.