Moderating effect of capital intensity on the relationship between leverage and financial distress in the U.S. restaurant industry

During the recent and ongoing economic turmoil, countless businesses have been facing financial distress and many have filed for bankruptcy. This issue is especially critical for the restaurant industry due to restaurants’ sensitivity to economic fluctuations. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the financial distress issue in the U.S. restaurant industry. In particular, the study examines a moderating effect of capital intensity on the relationship between a firm's leverage and degree of financial distress. The dataset includes publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms during the period 1990–2008. The study measures the degree of financial distress by modified Z-scores, and findings suggest a positive moderating effect of capital intensity on the relationship between leverage and financial distress.     

Do rice prices follow a random walk? Evidence from Markov switching unit root tests for Asian markets

This study revisits the issue of mean reversion in the import rice prices of six Asian countries over the period between 1995 and 2015. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with a conventional linear regression model support the presence of a unit root in the levels of the price data. However, when regressions allow for Markov switching in coefficients and variances to capture periodic shifts in levels and volatilities, there is strong evidence against the unit‐root null hypothesis in favor of stationarity over much of the observation period.     

ECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS OF BRAND ADVERTISING PROGRAMMES FOR U.S. ORANGE JUICE IN THE EUROPEAN MARKET: AN ERROR COMPONENT ANALYSIS

An econometric model is used to measure the impact of the Three-Party Programme on European demand for U.S. orange juice. The results show that the programme has helped expand the demand for orange juice in European countries and, from the viewpoint of the U.S. citrus industry, is an economically preferred way of generating additional exports compared with using price reductions to achieve additional sales.     

AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATION TO THE KUWAITI POULTRY MARKET

Changes in exporter market shares in the Kuwaiti poultry import market over the period 1971–81 are analysed by three modelling procedures. Two traditional approaches, a first-order constant transition probability Markov model and a set of market share equations, are found to be of only limited use. As an alternative, a multinominal logit model of market share behaviour is estimated. The empirical results indicate that, in addition to relative price changes, domestic policy inducements for Brazilian and European Community exports are important in determining market share changes. A comparison of the explanatory abilities of the models suggests that the multinominal logit model is as least as good as traditional modelling alternatives with respect to econometric criteria. It is concluded that the multinominal logit model offers considerable promise as a tool for market share research.     

Regional Economic Disparity,Financial Disparity,and National Economic Growth: Evidence from China

The dynamic relations among national economic growth, economic disparity, and financial disparity in China are examined. Specifically, the focus is on whether economic disparity or financial disparity affects national economic growth. As measures of economic and financial disparity across regions and provinces, the Williamson coefficient of disparity is employed using both regional data (eastern, central, and western) and provincial data (from 31 provinces). Overall, it is found that both provincial financial disparity and, to a lesser degree, economic disparity have a negative effect on national economic growth. In addition, financial disparity appears to be exogenous, suggesting that financial disparity is not influenced by either economic disparity or national economic growth.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

WHY IS CASH (STILL) SO ENTRENCHED? INSIGHTS FROM CANADIAN SHOPPING DIARIES

One similarity among many developed economies is the predominance of cash over electronic payments in terms of payment frequency, especially for the low‐value transactions that are the bulk of retail payments. We use the Bank of Canada's 2009 Methods‐of‐Payment Survey, which collected information on consumers' payment choices through shopping diaries, to estimate a simple model of choice between cash and other payment methods. Results suggest that the main reasons cash is still a popular payment instrument in Canada, especially for low‐value transactions, are its wide acceptance among merchants compared with other alternatives, speed and ease of use, and low marginal cost when on hand. (JEL E41, D12, L81)     

The Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity: Evidence from Somali Piracy

In the past decade (2000–2010), pirates from Somalia have carried out thousands of attacks on cargo ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, causing what others have identified as significant damage to maritime trade. In this paper, we use variations in the spread and intensity of Somali piracy to estimate its effect on the volume of international trade. By comparing trade volume changes along shipping routes located in pirate waters to those that are not, we estimate that Somali piracy reduced bulk commodities trade passing through the Gulf of Aden by 4.1% per year from 2000 to 2010. We find smaller reductions in total trade, consistent with the fact that not all goods are shipped by sea or are targets of pirate attacks. While our estimates suggest that the trade costs of piracy are much lower than what has been suggested in the existing literature, we find that they remain significant and unevenly distributed, with five countries and the EU shouldering 70% of the total costs.     

Biased managers with network externalities

In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.