PATENT POOLS AND CROSS‐LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF PATENT LITIGATION*

This article develops a framework to analyze the incentives to form a patent pool or engage in cross‐licensing arrangements in the presence of uncertainty about the validity and coverage of patents that makes disputes inevitable. It analyzes the private incentives to litigate and compares them with the social incentives. It shows that pooling arrangements can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from challenges. This result has an antitrust implication that patent pools should not be permitted until after patentees have challenged the validity of each other's patents if litigation costs are not too large.     

Incentive Compensation and the Likelihood of Termination: Theory and Evidence from Real Estate Organizations

We analyze two managerial compensation incentive devices: the threat of termination and pay for performance. We first develop a simple model predicting that these devices are substitutes: when termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives. We then use data from real estate organizations to provide two independent tests of the model’s central prediction. First, we use the fact that chief executive officers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and general partners of Real Estate Limited Partnerships (RELPs) perform similar tasks, yet organizational features of RELPs ensure that the latter are much harder to terminate. Consistent with the model, we find that pay‐for‐performance sensitivity is much higher for general partners of RELPs, where the termination threat is less credible. Second, we use a recent cross‐section of REITs to show that in property types where it is expected to be more costly to replace managers, those managers have stronger pay‐for‐performance incentives.     

Trade flow lags, monetary and fiscal policy, and exchange-rate overshooting

In this paper model a is constructed that combines trade slow lags with the model in the appendix to Dornbusch's seminal paper on exchange-rate dynamics. Here output is free to vary and inflation is determined by a simple Phillips curve mechanism. It turns out that, because of the trade slow lags, monetary expansion causes interest rates to decline, but the exchange rate need not oveshoot, as one would expect; whereas fiscal policy always produces overshooting. It follows that monetary policy may be a less important source of exchange-rate variability than is commonly believed, and fiscal policy more important.     

Exports and antitrust: Complements or substitutes?

Conflicting arguments have recently been voiced concerning the impact of antitrust statutes on the export performance of U.S. industries. On the one hand, opponents of vigorous enforcement have argued that antitrust constraints prevent firms from achieving efficiencies, thereby hampering competitiveness on world markets. On the other hand, proponents of antitrust have argued that vigorous enforcement tempers monopolistic pricing, thereby improving export performance. This paper presents an empirical test of these competing arguments. Our results indicate that Sherman Act Section 1 (price-fixing) enforcement has a positive effect on export shares, while Clayton Act Section 7 (merger) enforcement appears to have a negative effect.     

Cooperative R&D with product market competition

A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.     

Effects of the Private–Label Invasion in Food Industries

Using supermarket scanner data, we test a variety of hypotheses from trade journals about the invasion of private–label food products. According to conventional industry wisdom, name–brand firms defended their brands against new private–label products by lowering their prices, engaging in additional promotional activities, and increasingly differentiating their products. Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with these beliefs.     

CIM: Computer interviewing by mail

The use of micro computers in personal interviewing is not a new phenomenon. However, even with the rapidly growing number of people who have access to personal computers, self-administered computer interviewing in the social sciences is rarely implemented. In the following article the utility of Computer-Aided Survey Techniques (CASTs) is accessed through comparisons with Paper-Interview Survey Techniques (PISTs), and further, through comparisons between the different types of CASTs themselves. In addition, Computer Interviewing by Mail (CIM), one of the latest CASTs, is critically reviewed in a project of pirating software among Dutch computer users.Marc Jacobs can be reached by telefax +31-30 53 44 05.