The governance environment and innovative SMEs

This paper examines the impact of the governance environment on SME performance, concentrating on differences between innovators and non-innovators. A poor environment is related to lower profits and sales for SME innovators than non-innovators. Using a complementary indicator, SME innovators tend to have higher sales and profits when courts are perceived to be strong. On the other hand, the governance environment does not impact large innovative and non-innovative firm performance differently. Latin America and the Caribbean is a region with many entrepreneurs but few innovators. The region also has a larger proportion of smaller firms compared to other regions. In this context, lessons on SME constraints related to governance are important for developing enabling policies.     

Using the Family Self‐Sufficiency Program to Help Families with Housing Assistance Improve Earnings,Credit Score,and Debt Levels: A Quasi‐Experimental Analysis

HUD's Family Self‐Sufficiency (FSS) program aims to help housing assistance recipients increase their earnings and build savings to make progress toward economic security. This study examines an asset‐building nonprofit's innovative financial coaching‐based approach to FSS that adds an additional focus on helping clients build assets and financial capability. We use a quasi‐experimental approach to estimate the program's impact on earnings and cash assistance receipt and analyze credit and debt outcomes against a benchmark group. The findings show substantial, significant gains in households' earnings and significant decreases in receipt of some cash benefits. Participants also saw increases in credit score, and success in paying down credit card and derogatory debt. Our results indicate that FSS can be an effective platform for helping participants in subsidized housing make real progress toward economic security and financial health.     

On Welfare under Cournot and Bertrand Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies

Häckner (2000, Journal of Economic Theory 93, 233–239) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms, prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of Singh and Vives (1984, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546–554) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is sensitive to the duopoly assumption. Häckner (2000, Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233–239), however, leaves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition. This note shows that in Häckner’s model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition, regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.     

Rethinking “Strength of Incentives” for Executives of Financial Institutions

The recent crisis has caused some finance theorists and practitioners to rethink the effects of managerial incentives on the total enterprise value of large financial institutions. This re-examination has identified and analyzed a number of potential problems with the use of equity-based compensation, including insufficiently long managerial time horizons as well as the temptation for excessive risk-taking provided by “asymmetric” payoff structures in which shareholders have virtually all the upside while debtholders bear most of the downside risk. In an attempt to address such problems, finance and governance scholars have increasingly explored the possible value of aligning managerial interests with those of not only shareholders, but other important corporate claimants such as debtholders and taxpayers. After reviewing the latest thinking about risk and managerial incentives at financial institutions, the authors come to the following conclusions:

• • The design of incentives for value maximization needs to reflect a healthy appreciation of downside risk as well as upside reward, and both senior and subordinated debt may be ideal instruments for establishing that balance. At the same time, most senior executives should continue to receive equity-linked compensation in addition to significant proportions of “inside debt.”
• • Since decision-makers below the highest level executives of large financial institutions collectively wield enormous power to assume and manage risks, this “upper-middle” tier of managers deserves special attention. Rather than rewarding these managers with stock or options, the authors suggest use of a combination of uncapped but “held-at-risk” bonuses denominated in subordinated inside debt as the best way of rewarding effort and competence while controlling opportunities for risk-shifting.

     

Life Sciences Roundtable: Strategy and Financing

In light of the challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, a distinguished group of pharma executives and strategic and financial advisers discusses the following corporate decisions:

相似文献