Is Whistle-blowing Compatible with Employee Loyalty?

Whistle-blowing would appear to involve a conflict between employee loyalty and protection of public interest. Several business ethicists have, however, argued that this conflict is indeed merely apparent. According to the central argument to that effect, when the nature of employee loyalty is understood correctly, it becomes clear that whistle-blowing does not threaten employees’ loyalty to their employer. This is because blowing the whistle about one’s employer’s wrongdoing and being loyal to them serves the same goal, the moral good of the employer. In this article, I assess this philosophical argument for the conclusion that the moral problem of whistle-blowing is not real. I argue that the way of defending the view that whistle-blowing is not morally problematic is implausible.     

Pension Prefunding, Ageing, and Demographic Uncertainty

Pension prefunding can be used to smooth contribution rates in economies where ageing will increase pension expenditure. But how extensive should prefunding be in a defined benefit pension system when there is considerable uncertainty concerning future mortality, fertility, and migration? We study the prefunding rules in the Finnish earnings-related pension system with an OLG simulation model. The results show that increasing the degree of prefunding could yield a more even intergenerational outcome and make future generations' position better, but it is quite possible to overshoot and harm current generations too much. Making the degree of prefunding fertility-dependent appears to be a useful alternative. With declining fertility, current large cohorts would pay modestly increased contributions. The accumulated funds, however, will be huge in relation to the wage bills of smaller future cohorts.     

Julie Hessler. A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. xvi + 366 pp. ISBN 0-691-11492-7, $39.50.

Julie Hessler’s work is the first comprehensive historyof the first thirty-five years of Soviet trade written afterthe opening of the Soviet Union’s archives following thatnation’s collapse. It will, without doubt, become a standardwork of reference. Hessler gives due credit to the Soviet historianG. A. Dikhtiar’s three-volume work on Russian and Soviettrade published in the 1960s (in Russian). Despite the book’sobvious ideological overtones, it deserves to be read alongsideHessler’s work. Hessler’s     

Financial Matching, Asymmetric Information and Entrepreneurial Risk Taking

We study financial matching in credit markets when entrepreneurs have private information about their success potential. Entrepreneurs can search for financing for either a “risky” or a “safe” investment and only the risky project is sensitive to entrepreneurs' intrinsic “types”. There is excess risk taking in the sense that entrepreneurs with inefficiently low success probabilities choose the risky investment. However, steady states featuring greater market liquidity are associated with higher efficiency. As market liquidity also reflects the intensity of competition among financiers, earlier results which indicate a negative relationship between competition and allocative efficiency do not hold in our setup.     

Anticipating Tax Changes: Evidence from the Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform of 2005*

Using register‐based panel data covering all Finnish firms from 1999 to 2004, we examine how corporations anticipated the 2005 dividend tax increase via changes in their dividend and investment policies. The Finnish capital and corporate income tax reform of 2005 creates a useful opportunity to measure this behaviour, since it involves exogenous variation in the tax treatment of different types of firms. The estimation results reveal that those firms that anticipated a dividend tax hike increased their dividend payouts in a statistically significant way. This increase was not accompanied by a reduction in investment activities, but rather was associated with increased indebtedness in non‐listed firms. The results also suggest that the timing of dividend distributions probably offsets much of the potential for increased dividend tax revenue following the reform.     

Moral Hazard,Income Taxation and Prospect Theory*

The standard theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty has been developed under the assumption that individuals maximise expected utility. However, prospect theory has now been established as an alternative model of individual behaviour, with empirical support. This paper explores the theory of optimal income taxation under uncertainty when individuals behave according to the tenets of prospect theory. It is seen that many of the standard results are modified in interesting ways. The first‐order approach for solving the optimisation problem is not valid over the domain of losses, and the marginal tax schedule offers full insurance around the reference consumption level. The implications of non‐welfarist objectives under income uncertainty are also examined.     

Consumer Choice Behavior and Electronic Shopping Systems – A Theoretical Note

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of alternative approaches in modeling consumer choice behavior with respect to making purchases either in the traditional manner or using an electronic shopping system. We concentrate on the effects of two specific features: the amount of time spent on shopping and the shopping experience. We consider a simple two-good situation in which one good is a composite good that consists of all goods purchased electronically, and the other is the composite of all goods purchased in a traditional manner. The models suggest that both time saved and an increase in shopping experience related to Web-based shopping will lead to increased purchasing at a Web shop.     

The price of responsiveness: Cost analysis of change orders in make-to-order manufacturing

The ability to produce goods according to customers' specifications may be an important competitive advantage, but it exposes manufacturers to the risk of customers requesting changes in their specifications during the fulfillment of their orders. Manufacturers often accept these change orders in the name of customer service despite the fact that they incur additional costs. This study uses empirical data and activity-based costing to explore the real values and the accrual mechanisms of change orders' costs. The results show that the total costs are considerable, but the analyses also reveal opportunities for cost savings through the categorization of change orders, time fencing techniques, and improvements in information processing.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.