On the realized volatility of the ECX CO2 emissions 2008 futures contract: distribution, dynamics and forecasting

This article documents the conditional and unconditional distributions of the realized volatility for the 2008 futures contract in the European climate exchange (ECX), which is valid under the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). Realized volatility measures from naive, kernel-based and subsampling estimators are used to obtain inferences about the distributional and dynamic properties of the ECX emissions futures volatility. The distribution of the daily realized volatility in logarithmic form is shown to be close to normal. The mixture-of-normals hypothesis is strongly rejected, as the returns standardized using daily measures of volatility clearly departs from normality. A simplified HAR-RV model (Corsi in J Financ Econ 7:174–196, 2009) with only a weekly component, which reproduces long memory properties of the series, is then used to model the volatility dynamics. Finally, the predictive accuracy of the HAR-RV model is tested against GARCH specifications using one-step-ahead forecasts, which confirms the HAR-RV superior ability.     

The rate of learning‐by‐doing: estimates from a search‐matching model

We construct and estimate by maximum likelihood a job search model where wages are set by Nash bargaining and idiosyncratic productivity follows a geometric Brownian motion. The proposed framework enables us to endogenize job destruction and to estimate the rate of learning‐by‐doing. Although the range of the observations is not independent of the parameters, we establish that the estimators satisfy asymptotic normality. The structural model is estimated using Current Population Survey data on accepted wages and employment durations. We show that it accurately captures the joint distribution of wages and job spells. We find that the rate of learning‐by‐doing has an important positive effect on aggregate output and a small impact on employment. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Properties of a Risk Measure Derived from Ruin Theory

This paper studies a risk measure inherited from ruin theory and investigates some of its properties. Specifically, we consider a value-at-risk (VaR)-type risk measure defined as the smallest initial capital needed to ensure that the ultimate ruin probability is less than a given level. This VaR-type risk measure turns out to be equivalent to the VaR of the maximal deficit of the ruin process in infinite time. A related Tail-VaR-type risk measure is also discussed.     

PV adoption: the role of distribution tariffs under net metering

Journal of Regulatory Economics - The deployment of decentralized productions units (DPU) like rooftop solar panels is a major challenge for a transition towards greener energy sources. Under a net...     

Bidding for money

We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms are used: ex ante price posting, and ex post bidding (auctions). Also, we consider settings both with and without lotteries. We find that the model generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those with random matching and bargaining, but with different comparative static and welfare properties.     

Collateral,bank monitoring and firm performance: the case of newly established wine‐farmers

The present study aims to learn how collateral affects firm performance in the case of newly established wine producers. The issue is to identify the effects of collateral in situations of asymmetric information when the bank is the main financial partner of the entrepreneurs involved. On one hand, the use of collateral may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and thereby reduce the risk of repayment default. On the other hand, collateral may induce bad performance linked to a reduced monitoring of the investments by the bank. We herein test both hypotheses in two different cases: when the bank monitors the investments and when the bank does not.     

Markups,quality, and transport costs

This paper provides new evidence on trade prices based on firm-level data from France. It shows that firms charge higher free-on-board (net of transportation costs, hereafter noted as fob) unit values on exports to more distant countries. This finding holds within firms and products, and across destinations. The price premium paid by distant consumers is due to firms charging higher fob prices, and to higher transportation costs. A simple decomposition of the elasticity of import prices to distance shows that, after a fall in transport costs, almost 80% of the decline in import prices enjoyed by consumers is due to firms charging lower fob prices. This suggests a new channel through which changes in transport costs may affect welfare.     

On hierarchical competition in oligopoly

In this paper, we consider a hierarchical oligopoly model, in which firms compete on quantities of an homogeneous product. We provide a proof and an interpretation that under the three necessary and sufficient conditions of linear aggregate demand, constant and identical marginal costs, the strategy of leaders at any stage depends neither on the number of leaders who play after nor on the number of remaining stages. So, all firms behave as Cournotian oligopolists on the residual demand. We show that these three assumptions are not only sufficient but also necessary. Any departure from any of these assumptions rules out this property.     

Minimum Distance Estimation and Testing of DSGE Models from Structural VARs*

The aim of this paper is to complement the minimum distance estimation–structural vector autoregression approach when the weighting matrix is not optimal. In empirical studies, this choice is motivated by stochastic singularity or collinearity problems associated with the covariance matrix of impulse response functions. Consequently, the asymptotic distribution cannot be used to test the economic model's fit. To circumvent this difficulty, we propose a simple simulation method to construct critical values for the test statistics. An empirical application with US data illustrates the proposed method.     

Relation between bid–ask spread,impact and volatility in order-driven markets

We show that the cost of market orders and the profit of infinitesimal market-making or -taking strategies can be expressed in terms of directly observable quantities, namely the spread and the lag-dependent impact function. Imposing that any market taking or liquidity providing strategies is at best marginally profitable, we obtain a linear relation between the bid–ask spread and the instantaneous impact of market orders, in good agreement with our empirical observations on electronic markets. We then use this relation to justify a strong, and hitherto unnoticed, empirical correlation between the spread and the volatility per trade, with R ²s exceeding 0.9. This correlation suggests both that the main determinant of the bid–ask spread is adverse selection, and that most of the volatility comes from trade impact. We argue that the role of the time-horizon appearing in the definition of costs is crucial and that long-range correlations in the order flow, overlooked in previous studies, must be carefully factored in. We find that the spread is significantly larger on the NYSE, a liquid market with specialists, where monopoly rents appear to be present.