Leverage vs. feedback: Which Effect drives the oil market?

This article brings new insights on the role played by (implied) volatility on the WTI crude oil price. An increase in the volatility subsequent to an increase in the oil price (i.e. inverse leverage effect) remains the dominant effect as it might reflect the fear of oil consumers to face rising oil prices. However, this effect is amplified by an increase in the oil price subsequent to an increase in the volatility (i.e. inverse feedback effect) with a two-day delayed effect. This lead-lag relation between the oil price and its volatility is central to any type of trading strategy based on futures and options on the OVX implied volatility index. It is of interest to traders, risk- and fund-managers.     

Small transaction costs, absence of arbitrage and consistent price systems

The aim of this note is to establish a criterion of absence of arbitrage opportunities under small transaction costs for a family of multi-asset models of financial markets.     

A mediterranean agreement for tuna conservation: The political benefit of an international ITQ scheme

Mediterranean bluefin tuna have been increasingly overfished since the early 1990s, but the countries involved have so far been unable to reach an agreement on an ecologically and economically more efficient use of this shared resource. A system of individual transferable quotas could foster international agreement on reducing the total allowable catches. One condition for this, however, would be that fisheries be adequately compensated for the opportunity costs of decommissioning vessels.     

Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard

Like the gold standard, price-level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I and resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity) is reviewed. It suggests that, in practice, PT might operate with an escape clause that would allow rebasing of the price target in the face of large shocks. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we show that such an escape clause can produce multiple equilibria. For some parameterizations, there is a low credibility equilibrium (with high expectation of a reset) associated with high output volatility and frequent resets. These problems reduce, or reverse, the expectational advantage PT has over inflation targeting.     

The great increase in relative wage volatility in the United States

Over the past 25 years, real average hourly wages in the United States have become substantially more volatile relative to output. Microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to show that this increase in relative volatility is predominantly due to increases in the relative volatility of hourly wages across different groups of workers. Compositional changes of the workforce, by contrast, account for only a small fraction of the increase in relative wage volatility. Simulations with a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model illustrate that the observed increase in relative wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market (e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or more aggressive monetary policy). By contrast, greater flexibility in wage setting due to deunionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts as experienced by the U.S. labor market is capable of accounting for a substantial fraction of the observed increase in relative wage volatility. Greater wage flexibility also decreases the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations, suggesting an interesting new explanation for the Great Moderation.     

Agency costs of vertical integration—the case of family firms,investor‐owned firms and cooperatives in the French wine industry

Vertical integration theory has long suggested internal costs related to changes in incentives due to vertical integration, which means that vertical integration may lead to agency costs. In this work, we specify the notion of agency costs of vertical integration and extend Ang et al. (2000)'s measurement of agency costs to provide an empirical assessment of these costs in the French wine industry. Our econometric analysis finds that the agency costs of vertical integration may reach 2–3% of sales. It also showed that operating expenses of vertical integration are lower for cooperatives than for other firms, while vertical integration is less rewarding for them. This raises questions on the relation between agency costs in cooperatives and their performance.     

A GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS

This paper considers a generalization of the Stackelberg model to cover a T‐stage framework with several leaders and followers who compete on quantities. Assuming a linear demand function and constant marginal costs, we introduce constant conjectural variations in order to capture various structures of competition. First, we characterize the equilibrium market outcome. Second, we study the influence of conjectures on welfare. We notably propose a welfare comparison for six symmetric equilibria. Third, we consider convergence analysis, and we also show that the competitive equilibrium is a consistent oligopoly equilibrium.     

Technological Scanning by Small Canadian Manufacturers

Given that in many industries new production and information technologies have fundamentally changed the way in which firms must operate and compete, the technological aspect of environmental scanning has become a critical success factor for many small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. As little is presently known about how technological scanning manifests itself in these organizations and about what determines the nature and level of this activity, a survey study of 324 Canadian firms was done. Testing a research model resulted in identifying four interrelated dimensions of scanning activity, namely scanning objectives, type of information, information sources, and management practices. Key determinants of this activity were also identified, including the firms' strategy, environmental uncertainty, production technology, level of R&D, information networks, and the owner-manager's education level.     

Currency Unions in Africa: Is the Trade Effect Substantial Enough to Justify their Formation?

Using estimates that currency unions double trade, we quantify the welfare effects of forming currency unions for the African regional economic communities and for the African Union as a whole. The potential increase in trade is shown to be small, and much less than that resulting from the adoption of the euro. Allowing for increased African trade does not overturn the negative assessment of African currency unions, due to asymmetries in countries’ terms‐of‐trade shocks and their degree of fiscal discipline.