The impact of unconventional monetary policy on the market for collateral: The case of the French bond market

We consider the channel consisting in transferring the credit risk associated with refinancing operations between financial institutions to market participants. In particular, we analyze liquidity and volatility premia on the French government debt securities market, since these assets are used as collateral both in the open market operations of the ECB and on the interbank market. In our time-varying transition probability Markov-switching (TVTP-MS) model, we highlight the existence of two regimes. In one of them, which we refer to as the conventional regime, monetary policy neutrality is verified; in the other, which we dub the unconventional regime, monetary policy operations lead to volatility and liquidity premia on the collateral market. The existence of these conventional and unconventional regimes highlights some asymmetries in the conduct of monetary policy.     

Market demand of smart but uninformed consumers rotates counterclockwise with better information: surprising welfare effects

Providing truthful and unbiased information about the true value of a good to a priori heterogeneous consumers generates a mean-preserving counterclockwise rotation of demand. The welfare analysis of such rotation in monopoly and perfectly competitive models indicates that consumers can lose surplus if they become better informed.     

Are leniency programs too generous?

I present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number of firms that report information. The optimal leniency policy involves what I refer to as a single informant rule—that is, leniency should be given only when a single firm reports information. The single informant rule allows to increase expected sanctions compared to the first informant rule, which overall improves cartel deterrence.     

Information percolation,momentum and reversal

We propose a joint theory of time-series momentum and reversal based on a rational-expectations model. We show that a necessary condition for momentum to arise in this framework is that information flows at an increasing rate. We focus on word-of-mouth communication as a mechanism that enforces this condition and generates short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Investors with heterogeneous trading strategies—contrarian and momentum traders—coexist in the marketplace. Although a significant proportion of investors are momentum traders, momentum is not completely eliminated. Word-of-mouth communication spreads rumors and generates price run-ups and reversals. Our theoretical predictions are in line with empirical findings.     

Contrarian investment strategies work better for dually-traded stocks: Evidence from Hong Kong

We investigate the profitability of contrarian investment strategies for equities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), which are separated into cross-listed firms and firms listed only in Hong Kong. We also investigate the relationship between stock returns and past trading volume for these equities. We report significantly higher contrarian profits for the period investigated and find that this is a persistent feature of stock returns for cross-listed companies. We also document that contrarian portfolios earn returns as high as 8.01% per month for the dually-traded companies and just 1.83% for only HKEX-listed firms. We find that volume has only a limited ability to explain contrarian profits. All extreme profits disappeared after adjusting for the Fama and French three-factor model.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Externality in labor supply and government spending

Standard business cycle models face difficulties generating (i) government spending multipliers exceeding unity and (ii) stabilizing effects of government size. Using a simple model with externality in labor supply, we show that a sufficient degree of complementarity between aggregate and private labor supplies is key to reproducing these stylized facts.     

The welfare cost of monopolistic competition: a quantitative assessment

This paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a simple parametric class of endogenous growth models, embedding the neoclassical growth framework as a special case. We put particular emphasis on taking transitional dynamics into account. In doing so, we develop an original two-step numerical procedure to compute the value function. We find for conservative calibrations that the welfare cost of monopolistic competition can be anywhere between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption, depending on whether labor is elastically or inelastically supplied.     

Combining an inter-sectoral carbon tax with sectoral mitigation policies: Impacts on the French forest sector

As France works out its plan to tackle climate change issues, questions are arising in the forest sector as to how sectoral mitigation programs such as those designed to enhance fuelwood consumption or to stimulate in-forest carbon sequestration may coincide with an inter-sectoral program such as an economy-wide carbon tax. This paper provides insights into this question by exploring the impacts of (1) a combination of a carbon tax and a fuelwood policy, and (2) a combination of a carbon tax and a sequestration policy on (i) the economy of the forest sector, and (ii) the dynamics of the forest resource. To do this, we used a modified version of the French Forest Sector Model (FFSM) and carried out simulations on a 2020 time horizon. Basing our analysis on the fuelwood sector, we showed that wood producers always benefit from the combination of a carbon tax with either a fuelwood policy or a sequestration policy at the national level. Conversely, and although it favors wood products instead of non-wood substitutes, a carbon tax always decreases consumer surpluses by increasing wood product prices. As a consequence, the combination of a carbon tax with sectoral policies is likely to raise questions about the political economy of the mitigation program. This is particularly true in the case of a combination of a carbon tax with a sequestration policy, which already decreases consumer surpluses. We eventually showed that by increasing transport costs between domestic regions, the carbon tax reallocates production patterns over French territory which could lead to the necessity of a regional breakdown of policy-mixes in the forest sector.