A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.     

FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING: IMPACT ON HOUSING

The purpose of this paper is to describe the primary factors that helped encourage the growth of savings and loan business and its development as the primary mortgage originating and investing intermediary. This will be followed by a discussion of how and why changes have been made to alter the sheltered environment of the business. Finally, the paper will focus on several options for the future structure of the savings and loan business and the implications each has on our mortgage delivery system and housing
The paper concludes that the country in general and its housing needs, in particular, would be best served by freeing up the asset and liability powers of thrifts. In order to meet the mortgage finance needs of the country, it is recommended that increased emphasis be put on making mortgages investment grade assets that will be able to compete with other investments for funds in the capital market generally. To do this, the government must refrain from price fixing (i.e., setting specific prepayment penalties, savings rates, etc.); establishing terms and conditions on mortgages (i.e., regulating mortgage forms); changing contractual provisions on mortgages (i.e., due-on-sale prohibitions), and avoiding noncompetitive behavior by government credit programs.     

Social Discount Rates from Stratospheric Ozone Control*

We develop a model of optimal project timing to infer the discount rate US residents attach to investments in stratospheric ozone preservation. In this model, the calendar date at which preservation-related benefits offset costs is shown to be an increasing function of the real social rate of time preference. Estimates of US costs and benefits associated with the original (1987) Montreal Protocol are used to determine a range of discount rates from the US control of stratospheric ozone depletion. From this example the range is about 3.0 to 8.77 per cent.     

IMPLICATIONS OF LIBERALISED EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS

This paper reviews the alternative labour market scenarios open to European policymakers in the current movement towards enhanced economic and political integration. To clarify the various issues, the paper dichotomises the policy alternatives into two camps: "euro-liberalists" and "euro-regulators." The paper concludes that the latter offers the best path towards convergence, with the proviso that the subject of regulation is a Pan-European system of labour market objectives rather than institutions.     

Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation

Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e., can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.