Attitudes toward employee participation in decision-making: A comparison of european and american managers in a united states multinational company

This article examines an American multinational company to uncover any crossnational differences in managerial attitudes toward employee participation in decision-making. Human resource practices of the parent company toward its European subsidiaries were also examined, especially those relevant to employee participation issues. Data were collected from the company's manufacturing facilities in Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. Managers were interviewed and then surveyed regarding their attitudes toward participation. The interviews revealed resistance to the parent company's efforts to “export” an American vision of employee participation to its European subsidiaries. The survey data revealed attitudinal differences among European managers as well as among their American counterparts. Possible explanations, implications for human resource executives and research directions are discussed. © 1993 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Ethics <Emphasis Type="Italic">versus</Emphasis> Ethos in US and UK Megabanking

Company law in the US and UK fails to acknowledge that authorities’ propensity to rescue giant banks from the consequences of insolvency creates an implicit contract that assigns taxpayers a coerced and badly structured equity stake in too-big-to-fail institutions. The entrenched managerial norm of maximizing stockholder value abuses this stake. It does so by lending an undeserved moral legitimacy to efforts by TBTF managers to take on dangerous levels of tail risk because their bank’s deep downside is effectively eliminated by the prospect of unlimited taxpayer support. Conventional tools of prudential regulation constrain but do not de-legitimate this behavior. To accomplish that end, this paper calls for: (1) a formal recognition of the fiduciary duties and dividends that TBTF firms owe to taxpayers and (2) criminalizing aggressive pursuit of safety-net subsidies as a form of public endangerment.     

Rater Rating‐Level Bias and Accuracy in Performance Appraisals: The Impact OF Rater Personality,Performance Management Competence,and Rater Accountability

We studied the problem of rating‐level bias and rating accuracy among retail managers of a Fortune 500 retailer. Hypotheses were tested regarding the relationship among managers’ Five‐Factor Model (FFM) personality characteristics, their competence in performance management, and their levels of bias and accuracy in appraisals made in situations differing on levels of rater accountability. Associate store managers (N = 125) rated subordinates, peers and managers under conditions of high and low rater accountability. We found support for the stability of rating‐level bias across rating situations. Raters’ levels of agreeableness and assertiveness were related to mean rating levels across situations, and U‐shaped relationships were found in predicting one measure of rating accuracy such that high and low levels of these two traits were related to greater rating inaccuracy. Conscientiousness scores were significantly (and negatively) correlated with highly accountable mean ratings of subordinates. Performance management competence was related to rating‐level bias in both high‐ and low‐accountability conditions and contributed incremental validity in the prediction of rating level and rating accuracy. Our results indicate that the most lenient raters are more agreeable, less assertive, and less competent in performance management. These raters may also be less accurate. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Adoption and impact of improved maize varieties on maize yields: Evidence from central Cameroon

This study uses both the endogenous switching regression and propensity score matching models to analyze the adoption and impact of improved maize varieties on maize yields in central Cameroon. The results show that (i) education level, agricultural training, proximity to an Institute of Agricultural Research for Development branch and farmers’ perceptions of yield and risk of improved maize varieties significantly affect the adoption of improved maize varieties and (ii) the adoption of improved maize varieties enhances maize yields. Therefore, policies designed to stimulate adoption of improved maize varieties should be promoted. Improvement of access to school and agricultural training may serve as good strategies for promoting the adoption of improved maize varieties in Cameroon.     

Architecture of Supra-Governmental International Financial Regulation

Supra-governmental regulatory institutions (SNRs) resemble bridges that span gaps in the jurisdiction of individual–country regulators. The most important bridges address cross-country problems of crisis management and development finance not just as forums but as portfolio lenders as well.At portfolio SNRs, traditional cash-flow accounting supports incentives to overlend to countries undergoing crisis and to direct insufficient development funds to the world's neediest countries. Better performance requires not so much a structural streamlining of SNR missions as a realignment of the bureaucratic incentive systems under which SNR managers function. To accomplish this, reformers must focus on identifying economically meaningful indexes of SNR achievement and experimenting with programs that link deferred managerial compensation at SNRs to sustained long-period movements in the selected indexes.     

Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk

Official definitions of systemic risk leave out the role of government officials in generating it. Policymakers’ support of creative forms of risk-taking and their proclivity for absorbing losses in crisis situations encourage opportunistic firms to foster and exploit incentive conflicts within the supervisory sector. To restore faith in the diligence, competence, and integrity of officials responsible for managing the financial safety net, reforms need to rework incentives in the government and financial sectors. The goal should be to align the incentives of private risk managers, accountants, credit-rating firms, and government supervisors with those of ordinary taxpayers. This article describes a series of complementary ways of advancing toward this goal. The most important steps would be to measure regulatory performance in terms of its effect on the loss exposures that the safety net passes through to taxpayers and to require institutions that benefit from the net to produce information that would support this effort. This entails estimating the explicit and implicit safety-net benefits individual institutions receive and issuing extended-liability securities whose prices would improve the accuracy of these estimates.