Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Diversification to mitigate expropriation in the tobacco industry

While it is well established that diversifying acquisitions by large, cash-rich firms destroy shareholder wealth, we document positive abnormal returns to such acquisitions in the tobacco industry. We show that these abnormal returns are associated with proxies for lower expected expropriation costs. Specifically, we show that wealth creation increases in the degree of domestic geographic expansion afforded by the acquisition (increasing tobacco firms’ influence in more political districts) and in the liquidity of tobacco firms’ assets (converting cash to harder-to-expropriate operating assets). We also show that the threat of expropriation constrains payments to shareholders before expropriation becomes certain in 1998.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts’ targets through tax expense decreases

Returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts, but negative when firms miss. Prior research finds little substantial discount for managing earnings to beat the forecasts via accruals generally. We consider whether the market reward for beating the forecast is smaller when firms use tax expense decreases, which are visible and transparent at the earnings announcement date, unlike accruals. When firms beat analysts’ forecasts by decreasing their tax expense relative to the third-quarter rate, the market discounts the reward by an economically significant amount: approximately 86%. We document lower persistence of current-year tax changes for those firms that decrease tax expense to beat the target. The observed discount for beating the forecast only because of a third to fourth quarter tax decrease may reflect market perceptions of the lack of persistence of the decrease.     

Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect: Empirical Evidence from Europe

Corporate real estate disposals have increased in Europe during the past few years. In this research paper, we study market reactions of publicly traded European companies' real estate sale and leaseback announcements during 1998–2004. This study is one of the first ones to study the sale and leaseback impact on corporate value with a pan‐European data. We find that the sale and leaseback announcements have on average positive impact to firm's value which is in line with the previous studies. However, we also find that the positive effect is mainly caused by the deals with high transaction value to company market value ratio. Smaller transactions do not create on average any abnormal returns. Our results support the hypothesis that the positive sale and leaseback announcement effect is a consequence of revealed hidden value of the company's assets. Thus, sale and leaseback can also be seen as a mechanism for revealing the hidden value of company's assets to the market.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

Testing the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis during the 1920s

This paper reexamines the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis (FRUH) during the 1920s and it contributes to the literature as follows: first, it utilizes a database that includes currencies not studied before, as well as the 3 month forward rates; second, it applies three different approaches to test for cointegration and it shows that the choice of the technique is not of crucial importance; third, it tests for the temporal stability of the cointegration results; finally, it tests for the existence of the FRUH in the short run, by means of error correction models, whereas previous studies focused on cointegrated vectors only. Our analysis shows that for countries that did not undergo major financial turmoil during that period, there exists more favorable evidence for the FRUH.     

在外协环境中实施RCM的计划(续)--瑞典水电站的一个案例研究

在实施RCM项目时，重点工作放在RCM分析和开发一个适当的RCM模式。但是实施RCM的计划和准备工作开始时，就觉得这项工作过分复杂，并且颇难处理。准备工作屡次被延迟，并且增加了活动次数和资源。工作进度的延迟对这个项目产生了一些影响。例如，项目领导人员有了变动、培训和教育工作要进行多次。在计划和准备阶段可以观察到以下一些问题。     

Sales technology within the salesperson's relationships: A research agenda

The average cost of a sales call has declined approximately 15% over the past decade, while average salesperson compensation has doubled. These statistics illustrate an important benefit of technology: salespeople are more productive. To better understand the impact technology has played on sales and sales management, this paper examines the impact of sales technology from four perspectives: the salesperson, the field sales manager, the sales executive, and the customer. Noting that the needs and evaluations of technology vary, depending upon the functional position and viewpoint, a research agenda is offered that reflects these various perspectives.     

Foreign‐based competition and corporate diversification strategy

Since the mid‐1980s U.S. domestic firms have faced significant increases in foreign‐based (i.e., import) competition as reductions in barriers to international commerce have resulted in markets and industries becoming increasingly global. Despite the growing and widespread importance of foreign‐based competition, the influence that such competition may exert on corporate diversification strategy is a question largely overlooked in the strategic management literature. This paper examines the impact of foreign‐based competition in a firm's core business on both the level and nature of a firm's diversification strategy at the corporate level in a panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1985–94. Our findings provide the first evidence that increased foreign‐based competition is indeed a statistically significant factor explaining both the reduced business‐level diversity and the increased strategic focus of U.S. firms that has been widely perceived over the past two decades. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.