Compositional gaps and downward spirals in international joint venture management groups

We argue that compositional gaps in international joint venture (IJV) management groups, along parent company lines, will accentuate distinct managerial coalitions. Such gaps can occur on dimensions of observable demography, less apparent demography, or psychological characteristics. While compositional gaps in IJV management groups can provide the basis for healthy substantive conflict, such gaps—particularly if they are large—also tend to induce relationship conflict and heighten substantive conflict beyond its beneficial range. This can set off a downward spiral of relationship conflict, substantive conflict, and behavioral disintegration in the group. These harmful group processes further interact reciprocally with any tensions that might exist between the IJV parents, engendering a second downward spiral. Our model has implications for the performance of international joint ventures, and it serves as a foundation for designing interventions to avoid the downward spirals we portray. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF WARRANT-DEBT FINANCING

Stock price reactions to warrant-debt unit financing announcements are examined and a significant two-day average abnormal return of ?1.32 percent is found. The negative average abnormal return is similar to that observed for convertible debt financing announcements in previous research. Warrant-debt financing decisions result in large increases in capitalization; on average, issuers' long-term debt increases by 84 percent, and common shares outstanding increase by 18 percent assuming full exercise of the warrants.     

Through the mud or in the boardroom: Examining activist types and their strategies in targeting firms for social change

Research summary : We examine the variety of activist groups and their tactics in demanding firms' social change. While extant work does not usually distinguish among activist types or their variety of tactics, we show that different activists (e.g., social movement organizations vs. religious groups and activist investors) rely on dissimilar tactics (e.g., boycotts and protests versus lawsuits and proxy votes). Further, we show how protests and boycotts drag companies “through the mud” with media attention, whereas lawsuits and proxy votes receive relatively little media attention yet may foster investor risk perceptions. This research presents a multifaceted view of activists and their tactics and suggests that this approach in examining activists and their tactics can extend what we know about how and why firms are targeted. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study was to examine how different types of activist groups behave differently when targeting firms for social change. We find that traditional activist groups rely on boycotts and protests, whereas religious groups and activist investors rely more on lawsuits and proxy votes. Additionally, we find that protests and boycotts are associated with greater media attention, whereas lawsuits and proxy votes are associated with investor perceptions of risk. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using the Fraction of Missing Information to Identify Auxiliary Variables for Imputation Procedures via Proxy Pattern‐mixture Models

In many surveys, imputation procedures are used to account for non‐response bias induced by either unit non‐response or item non‐response. Such procedures are optimised (in terms of reducing non‐response bias) when the models include covariates that are highly predictive of both response and outcome variables. To achieve this, we propose a method for selecting sets of covariates used in regression imputation models or to determine imputation cells for one or more outcome variables, using the fraction of missing information (FMI) as obtained via a proxy pattern‐mixture (PMM) model as the key metric. In our variable selection approach, we use the PPM model to obtain a maximum likelihood estimate of the FMI for separate sets of candidate imputation models and look for the point at which changes in the FMI level off and further auxiliary variables do not improve the imputation model. We illustrate our proposed approach using empirical data from the Ohio Medicaid Assessment Survey and from the Service Annual Survey.     

Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy in the Czech Republic

In this paper we provide an account of most of the passive labor market policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990–1996 period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great detail. Using Labor Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of the work disincentive effects of the unemployment and social assistance benefits by comparing these benefits to market wages and by analyzing the effect of being in the system on the duration of unemployment of two cohorts of unemployed in 1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some disincentive effects for at least one group in the population.     

Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full‐line Forcing Contracts

Theoretical investigations have examined both anti‐competitive and efficiency‐inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full‐line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of full‐line forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor's gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full‐line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application.