Exports,Supply Constraints and Growth: An Investigation using Regional Data

In this work we first model the role of demand‐ and supply‐side factors (labour market adjustment, productive efficiency) in explaining economic growth. Empirically testing the model, we evaluate why different growth regimes may appear in the 20 Italian administrative regions. This exercise uses a two‐stage econometric approach. Estimates for the elasticity of manufacturing output to exports are obtained from regional time series: a significant long‐run relationship indicates the existence of a demand‐constrained growth regime. We then ascertain whether the regional dispersion of supply‐side factors has an impact on the regional dispersion of growth regimes. The empirical evidence supports our expectations of strong regional differences. Southern regions are less likely to display demand‐constrained regimes. In explanation of these differences, second‐stage analysis reveals that a strong role is played by such efficiency‐enhancing factors as technological innovation, bank diffusion and ‘social capital’. No role is found for labour market rigidities.     

Stochastic Demand for Hospitals and Optimizing "Excess" Bed Capacity

This paper addresses the issue of hospital bed capacity by considering the stochastic demand for United States hospitals. An equilibrium condition for the optimal number of "excess" beds is derived and applied using a cost function estimated with a panel data model for the period 1987-1992. Results indicate that it may be difficult to justify the costliness of existing levels of empty hospital beds. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should be cognizant of the potential effects of hospital mergers on undesirable excess bed capacity.     

The legal challenge to ERISA preemptions

Managed care, once celebrated as a vehicle to halt the increasing cost of health care, has come under increasing fire from patients and health care providers, accused of cutting costs and managing care at the expense of patients. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) has been a shield for managed care organizations (MCOs), buffeting them from liability for quality-of-care issues. Lawsuits and legislation are chipping away at the protective shield of ERISA as MCOs find themselves more liable for their decisions and for the care provided by physicians with whom the MCO contracts and provides financial incentives for controlling cost of medical care.     

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal–agent problems, and commons games, among others.     

Strongly stable networks

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a “top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous—depending on player labels.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.