Separating microstructure noise from volatility

There are two variance components embedded in the returns constructed using high frequency asset prices: the time-varying variance of the unobservable efficient returns that would prevail in a frictionless economy and the variance of the equally unobservable microstructure noise. Using sample moments of high frequency return data recorded at different frequencies, we provide a simple and robust technique to identify both variance components.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

The economic performance of the Russian economy in 2006 and a forecast for 2008–2010

This article examines the economic outcome of 2006 and builds a forecast for 2007–2010. The medium-term development risks of the Russian economy are analyzed.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Contemporary ethical issues in labor-management relations

Numerous labor-management issues possess ethical dimensions and pose ethical questions. In this article, the authors discuss four labor-management issues that present important contemporary problems: union organizing, labor-management negotiations, employee involvement programs, and union obligations of fair representation. In the authors view, labor and management too often view their ethical obligations as beginning and ending at the law's boundaries. Contemporary business realities suggest that cooperative and enlightened modes of interaction between labor and management seem appropriate.Robert S. Adler is Associate Professor of Legal Studies at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He teaches courses in Business Law, Business Ethics, and Regulation. Prior to coming to UNC, Professor Adler served as Counsel to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives.William J. Bigoness is Professor of Business Administration and Director, Center for Management Studies at the Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His professional interests include organizational behavior, human resource management, and labor-management relations. Dr. Bigoness was Visiting Professor of Business Administration at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) located in Lausanne, Switzerland from 1985 to 1987.     

Unemployment compensation and episodes of nonemployment

This paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance (UI) on the length of nonemployment spells experienced by young workers. The analysis introduces a flexible duration model to estimate the effects of the weekly benefit amount and weeks of eligibility on the amount of time spent between jobs by men, distinguishing between the experiences of UI and non-UI recipients. The empirical findings suggest three conclusions: (1) UI recipients experience longer spells of nonemployment than their non-UI recipient counterparts, at least up to the point of exhaustion of UI benefits; (2) the level of the weekly benefit amount does not significantly affect the length of nonemployment spells; and (3) increasing the number of weeks of eligibility offered by a UI program leads to longer episodes of nonemployment.     

Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.     

The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).