“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock,the man and the bioeconomist

My tribute paper on Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) provides some memorable stories of Tullock as a person and as a founder of bioeconomics. I include my speech, “Toast and roast: Gordon Tullock,” delivered on the occasion of Tullock’s 80th birthday; also the same “Toast and roast....,” written in the form of a poem, “Ode to Gordon Tullock.” I also discuss Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics. In a concluding section, I recall a couple of my poignant memories of Gordon Tullock.     

Inflation and the Exchange Rate: The Role of Aggregate Demand Elasticity

This paper examines the effect of aggregate demand elasticity on the exchange rate when inflation occurs. We discover that both the source of the inflation, whether demand-pull or cost-push, and the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to the price level, are of consequence for the exchange rate. We obtain two primary conclusions. First, the effect on the exchange rate of cost push inflation is ambiguous and is partially determined by the price level elasticity of aggregate demand. In particular, and assuming that the two examined countries have equivalent aggregate supply elasticities, we conclude that the nation with the less elastic aggregate demand function will see its currency appreciate relative to the other. Second, demand-pull inflation results in an unambiguous increase in the exchange rate but the size of that increase is partially a function of aggregate demand elasticity. Assuming again that two countries have equivalent aggregate supply elasticities, that country with the more elastic aggregate demand will experience currency appreciation.     

Favouritism towards the poor and a discontinuous tax structure

This article aims to theoretically clarify two points. First, even though the government shows favouritism to the poor and wants to exempt low-income taxpayers and to secure the necessary income tax revenue by taxing only high-income taxpayers, the government nevertheless ends up taxing the poor. This is in opposition to favouritism and arises because of the government’s inability to observe the individual taxpayer’s income levels. Second, even without observing each taxpayer’s income level, if favouritism is sufficiently strong, then the government can discontinuously resolve such unintentional taxation.     

Stock exchange mergers and market efficiency

The aim of this article is to examine the impact of stock exchange mergers on the degree of informational efficiency. For this purpose, we apply the generalized spectral shape test for the martingale difference hypothesis to the stock returns before and after the 31 domestic and cross-border mergers completed from 1997 to 2011. The test is conducted with moving subsample windows, allowing us to detect the periods of (in)efficiency, and thus to conduct a comparative analysis for pre-merger and post-merger periods. We find that higher levels of efficiency are less frequent than lower levels of efficiency after a stock exchange merger. We also find that the impact on the level of efficiency depends on a range of merger characteristics such as the level of development, size, geographical diversification and industrial diversification of stock exchange.     

The cost-effectiveness of exenatide twice daily (BID) vs insulin lispro three times daily (TID) as add-on therapy to titrated insulin glargine in patients with type 2 diabetes

Objective: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of exenatide twice daily (BID) vs bolus insulin lispro three times daily (TID) as add-on therapy when glycemic control is sub-optimal with titrated basal insulin glargine and metformin.

Methods: The analysis was based on the recent 4B Study, which compared exenatide BID and lispro TID as add-on therapies in subjects with type 2 diabetes insufficiently controlled, despite titrated insulin glargine. The Cardiff Diabetes Model was used to simulate patient costs and health benefits beyond the 4B Study. The Swedish healthcare perspective was adopted for this analysis; costs are reported in €EUR to aid interpretation. The main outcome measure was the cost per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained with exenatide BID compared to lispro TID.

Results: Exenatide BID was associated with an incremental cost of €1,270 and a QALY increase of +0.64 compared with lispro TID over 40 years. The cost per QALY gained with exenatide BID compared with lispro TID was €1,971, which is within conventional limits of cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness results were generally robust to alternative assumptions and values for key model parameters.

Limitations: Extrapolation of trial data over the longer term can be influenced by modeling and parameter uncertainty. Cost-effectiveness results were generally insensitive to alternative values of key model input parameters and across scenarios.

Conclusions: The addition of exenatide BID rather than insulin lispro to basal insulin is associated with similar or better clinical outcomes. Illustrated from the Swedish healthcare perspective, analysis with the Cardiff Diabetes Model demonstrated that exenatide BID represents a cost-effective treatment alternative to lispro TID as add-on therapy in type 2 diabetes patients insufficiently controlled on basal insulin.     

Expressive voting and two-dimensional political competition: an application to law and order policy by New Labour in the UK

There has been much debate regarding the electoral strategy adopted by New Labour in the lead-up to and then during their time in government. This paper addresses the issue from the perspective of left/right and liberal/authoritarian considerations by examining data on individual attitudes from the British Social Attitudes survey between 1986 and 2009. The analysis indicates that New Labour’s move towards the right on economic and public policy was the main driver towards attracting new centrist voters and could thus be labelled ‘broadly’ populist. The move towards a tougher stance on law and order was more ‘narrowly’ populist in that it was used more to minimise the reduction in support from Labour’s traditional base on the left than to attract new votes. The evidence presented provides support for an expressive theory of voting in that law and order policy was arguably used to counter alienation amongst traditional, left-wing Labour supporters.     

Attitudes Toward Catastrophe

In light of climate change and other global threats, policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes. This paper reflects on what society’s attitude toward low-probability, high-impact events is, or should be. We first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses. Based on this conception, we review studies from decision sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics that explore people’s attitudes toward various social risks. Contray to popular belief, we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion—the preference for a mean-preserving contraction of the loss distribution—and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations. Next, we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk. We explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other-regarding preferences. Finally, we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk.     

Is the Income Elasticity of the Willingness to Pay for Pollution Control Constant?

How willingness to pay for environmental quality changes as incomes rise is a central question in several areas of environmental economics. This paper explores both theoretically and empirically whether or not the willingness to pay (WTP) for pollution control varies with income. Our model indicates that the income elasticity of the marginal WTP for pollution reduction is only constant under very restrictive conditions. Our empirical analysis tests the null hypothesis that the elasticity of the WTP for pollution control with respect to income is constant, employing a multi-country contingent valuation study of eutrophication reduction in the Baltic Sea. Our findings reject this hypothesis, and estimate an income elasticity of the WTP for eutrophication control of 0.1–0.2 for low-income respondents and 0.6–0.7 for high-income respondents. Thus, our empirical results suggest that the elasticity is not constant but is always less than one. This has implications for how benefits transfer exercises, and for theoretical explanations of the environmental Kuznets curve.     

Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches

In the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models, climate-friendly leadership of a country is not successful: A unilateral increase of this country’s greenhouse gas abatement measures, i.e., contributions to the global public good of climate protection, will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding-out effect. In this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision. In particular, strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non-egoistic or other-regarding preferences or if the leader’s contribution positively affects the follower’s beliefs, i.e., his conjectural variations, about the leader’s behaviour.     

Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis

We consider a strategic situation in which a firm may conceal the illegal activity of violating environmental regulations and a regulator seeks to verify the illegality to punish the firm. We study two main factors, fines and social monitoring, that influence the firm’s decision in that situation. First, we find all the possible equilibria of our model and examine conditions of those two factors that lead to each equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we then study the optimal enforcement policies that induce the most socially desirable equilibrium and improve social welfare within each equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. First, the two factors have a complementary relationship in getting the most desirable equilibrium: Certain high levels of fines and social monitoring are both needed. Second, if making the social monitoring above the certain critical level is impossible, setting the level of the fines as high as possible may be the optimal enforcement policy. Finally, if setting the fines above the certain critical level is not available, either, setting the level of the fines as low as possible might be optimal, and the higher level of the social monitoring does not necessarily bring higher social welfare.