Tensions within an Industrial Research Laboratory: The Philips Laboratory's X-Ray Department between the Wars

Tensions arose in the X-ray department of the Philips researchlaboratory during the interwar period, caused by the interplayamong technological development, organizational culture, andindividual behavior. This article traces the efforts of Philipsresearchers to find a balance between their professional goalsand status and the company's strategy. The X-ray research, overseenby Gilles Holst, the laboratory's director, and Albert Bouwers,the group leader for the X-ray department, was a financial failuredespite technological successes. Nevertheless, Bouwers was ableto continue his X-ray research, having gained the support ofcompany owner Anton Philips. The narrative of the X-ray departmentallows us to explore not only the personal tensions betweenHolst and Bouwers, but also the interaction between individualgoals and company strategy in an industrial research laboratory.     

An introduction to nanotechnology policy: Opportunities and constraints for emerging and established economies

Nanotechnology has captured wide attention all over the world and excited the imagination of young and old alike. Interest in the subject has increased remarkably during the last few years because of potential technological applications, and commercial interest has skyrocketed. The promise of nanotechnology as an economic engine that can redefine the wellbeing of regions and nations is pervasive; yet the imprecise language, and overuse of the term nanotechnology, has made that term fuzzier, broader, and trendier than many imagined possible. This is especially evident in nanotechnology market projections, which rose dramatically over the past five years as more traditional “product families” were engulfed by the expanding use of the term. Government policy regarding nanotechnology has often resembled an embrace of imagination rather than a systematic use of what Sun Tzu and others have taught about strategic decision making. Further, if nanotechnology is truly the next wave of technology product paradigms, how will we provide an educated workforce to support it? Moreover, in company with these societal benefits come increased societal risks. This paper is intended to provide policy makers and strategists with observations that might limit actions such as those that led to the “over-hype” of nanotechnology and to the fear (or discounting) of societal risks. In the latter case we might learn from the experiences of policy makers connected with other emerging enabling-technology bases, such as nuclear energy and, to a lesser extent, the “dot-com” boom.     

The impact of demographic change on tax revenue

This paper stimulates the impact of demographic change on direct tax revenue for the Netherlands using extensive survey data and population projections. Projected demographic development in the Netherlands fits in well with the OECD mainstream. The analysis thus has a more general relevance. The simulations indicate a 27 percent rise in tax revenue until 2010 because of population growth and a relatively older labor force. After 2030, revenue falls as a consequence of a declining population and a rapidly rising share of the elderly. The authors also simulated a variant in which labor-force participation rates are set on the substantially higher OECD average. In this case, the increase in tax revenue almost doubles as compared to the base variant.     

Betting on the EMS

Two speculative strategies within the European Monetary System are empirically evaluated. The potential profitability of speculating on a currency's devaluation at a realignment crucially depends on being able to predict timing and magnitude of the parity change. Such opportunity has been eliminated from the system since 1983. For the reverse strategy of borrowing low, investing high, the evidence since 1983 suggests significant profitable opportunities for the weaker EMS countries — Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy — unconditional on knowledge of the timing of realignments. We conclude that this is due to a peso problem type of premium.     

Selecting copulas for risk management

Copulas offer financial risk managers a powerful tool to model the dependence between the different elements of a portfolio and are preferable to the traditional, correlation-based approach. In this paper, we show the importance of selecting an accurate copula for risk management. We extend standard goodness-of-fit tests to copulas. Contrary to existing, indirect tests, these tests can be applied to any copula of any dimension and are based on a direct comparison of a given copula with observed data. For a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds and real estate, these tests provide clear evidence in favor of the Student’s t copula, and reject both the correlation-based Gaussian copula and the extreme value-based Gumbel copula. In comparison with the Student’s t copula, we find that the Gaussian copula underestimates the probability of joint extreme downward movements, while the Gumbel copula overestimates this risk. Similarly we establish that the Gaussian copula is too optimistic on diversification benefits, while the Gumbel copula is too pessimistic. Moreover, these differences are significant.     

First steps: towards purposeful activities in scenario thinking and future studies

In this paper, we contribute to the understanding of the field of scenario development and future studies, which has been a key debate in Futures over the past three of four years. Our contribution is less on the philosophical issues surrounding future studies, but more on the hurdles faced by those interested in practising in the area of scenario planning and future studies. The issues presented and discussed in this article arise from a number of action learning research projects that we have conducted with small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Scotland, who have embraced scenario development for the first time as part of their strategic management and learning process.Our contribution is targeted at identifying and understanding the hurdles to be overcome when (such) organisations consider adopting scenario development or future studies. The contribution is designed to first, help those in the field of scenario development and future studies be mindful of these hurdles and to build a trusting relationship between the scenario practioner and the client, and secondly, help those managers willing to engage in such activities to better understand the purpose of such work.First we identify three key hurdles: (a) organisational culture (i.e. tacit assumptions on scenario development and future studies); (b) “client” state of mind; (c) fear of engaging with the outside/fear of the future. We argue that these hurdles are a serious threat to the relevance and effectiveness of futures work. We argue that these hurdles need to be better understood as a basis for improving the impact and contribution that scenario development and future studies can make.Later in this article we propose a framework to help understand the purpose of scenario development or future studies work. This framework can be used at the outset of any engagement or study, to help the “client” to identify the purpose of such work and to understand its role and scope. We argue that this framework contributes to more purposeful, relevant and actionable scenario development and future studies in the future.Unless you changed something in the minds of managers, a scenario project had failed (Harvard Bus. Rev. 63(6) (1985) 139). Going one-step further, we would argue that unless something tangible happens as the result of the scenario development and future studies work, we have wasted our time.     

'The apotheosis of holding company accounting': Unilever's financial reporting innovations from the 1920s to the 1940s

The annual reports of Unilever were widely hailed in the 1940s as outstanding examples of holding company accounting. The accounts did indeed contain many new and innovative features, including segment reporting of sales turnover. This contrasts with the frequently negative assessments of the company's reporting before World War II, and the fact that the company was on record as a relatively late adopter of consolidated statements. In this paper, Unilever's reporting practices from the 1920s to the 1940s are analysed. We argue that the reporting changes of the 1940s had clear antecedents in the 1920s and 1930s, when they emerged in conjunction with the transformation of Unilever from a family-dominated enterprise into a professionally managed organisation. We also argue that, in order to evaluate properly Unilever's pre-war reporting practices, one needs to take into consideration the nature of Unilever as a complex federation of companies, rather than a unitary organisation, and to examine the chairman's address at the annual general meetings. The speeches by Francis D'Arcy Cooper, in particular, contained important disclosures not found in the annual reports. By the early 1940s, Unilever's commitment to improve its financial reporting was sufficiently developed for its officials, in particular Geoffrey Heyworth and P.M. Rees, to play important roles in the drafting of the English Institute's Recommendations on Accounting Principles and in the deliberations of the Company Law Amendment Committee whose report led to the Companies Act 1947. We therefore conclude that Unilever should be ranked with such companies as Dunlop Rubber among the key actors in the modernisation of British financial reporting during the 1930s and 1940s.